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EU sleuths ignore special powers on tobacco smuggling

https://euobserver.com/investigations/131227

The EU’s anti-fraud agency has, in the past 11 years, made little use of the investigative instruments it gained under an EU agreement with Philip Morris International.

Documents uncovered via a freedom of information request by EUobserver show that in most years, the tobacco company did not receive any request for information from Olaf, as the anti-fraud agency is known.

Warehouse inspection in Portugal in 2003, before the agreement with PMI went into force (Photo: European Commission)

Warehouse inspection in Portugal in 2003, before the agreement with PMI went into force (Photo: European Commission)

The Anti-Contraband and Anti-Counterfeit Agreement between the EU, its member states, and Philip Morris International (PMI) was signed in July 2004. It will expire next year, and the commission is currently evaluating its impact, to help assess whether to renew it or not.

The deal, which also included the transfer of several hundred million euros to the EU and its members, gave Olaf the power to request information that could help it investigate cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting.

For instance, PMI agreed to “encourage its employees and/or agents to make themselves available to Olaf for interviews and for the purposes of giving sworn statements, as reasonably requested and required by Olaf.”

However, according to the annual reports which PMI was obliged to send to the EU about its compliance with the agreement, the tobacco company has never received such a request from Olaf.

The agreement also said that PMI should inform Olaf, when it requested this, of how much cigarettes PMI held in tax and customs warehouses. PMI’s reports noted that Olaf never did so.

EUobserver has received access to the 11 yearly reports that PMI has written, the first one published on 11 July 2005, the most recent one published 3 July 2015.

Approved Contractors

PMI promised in the agreement to conduct business only with so-called Approved Contractors, and to make sure that these third parties are also “able and committed to honour the objectives and practices” of the agreement, which aimed to reduce cigarette smuggling.

The agreement made an end to a legal fight between the EU and PMI, which had been accused of involvement in cigarette smuggling and thereby evading taxes.

The deal requires that PMI makes sure that if it sells cigarettes to another company, this company does not buy quantities much larger than the demand of its potential buyers (to make sure it doesn’t sell them in another country where the price of cigarettes is higher).

PMI is required to keep a list of all its approved contractors, and update it every six months. In the annual reports, it said it does.

But according to the same reports, Olaf only requested for the list once, on 16 August 2012, which means it officially has only a limited snapshot of the companies that PMI has worked with.

Olaf has apparently never requested the sales volumes of the approved contractors, or the due diligence reports which PMI is required to perform on its business partners.

Also, PMI reported in 2015 that “to date it has not received any formal request” to encourage its purchasers “to cooperate with the relevant administrations [i.e. Olaf] for the purposes of investigating cigarette smuggling and/or the laundering of proceeds arising out of the illegal trade in cigarettes”.

There were two additional instances when Olaf sent PMI a “request for information,” on 31 January 2014, and 25 February 2015, but the documents do not specify what these requests encompassed.

Another unused part of the EU-PMI deal is protocol 4 from annex B.

This protocol states that if Olaf can prove one of PMI’s contractors was “unlawfully or knowingly engaged in the sale, distribution, storage, or shipment of Contraband Cigarettes or any related Money Laundering”, PMI had to terminate its business relationship with that company.

According to PMI’s annual reports, the multinational “has not had occasion to terminate business relations with Approved Contractors in accordance with Protocol 4.01 or Protocol 4.02.”

Olaf was asked for a comment on Monday (23 November), but while its press office had said it would provide answers by Monday (30 November), it had not responded by Wednesday morning.

Will EU renew $1.25bn deal with tobacco firm PMI?

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Big tobacco tries to put its stamp on new packaging

http://www.politico.eu/article/big-tobacco-stamp-packaging-labeling-technology-sicpa-codentify-counterfeit/

Cigarette lobbyists take aim at a Swiss company over high-tech anti-counterfeit technology.

Tobacco lobbyists have joined forces in a bid to stop the European Commission from signing up a Swiss company to provide advanced “track and trace” technology to combat cigarette smuggling.

The fight is intensifying at the EU level as the European Parliament prepares to debate the matter and the Commission nears a long-awaited decision on cigarette packaging.

Tobacco companies, who want to use their own anti-counterfeit measures, argue that if the Commission awards Lausanne-based printing technology firm SICPA the contract, it will be granting it a monopoly that will wreak havoc on the industry.

“If SICPA’s solution is adopted, it would lock out every other provider in the sector,” one tobacco lobbyist said, dismissing the Swiss company as a “printer of banknotes” with little experience in cigarette distribution. “It would set a very unhealthy precedent.”

But SICPA believes there is more to Big Tobacco’s fierce response than concerns about free markets. A company spokesperson said the industry is concerned that a successful campaign to track the distribution of cigarettes across Europe would harm the tobacco companies’ business interests.

“This is what is at stake: A powerful, independent ‘track and trace’ regime would make illicit tobacco trade very difficult,” said a spokesperson for SICPA, a privately owned company that has provided its technology to Brazil, Kenya and a number of U.S. states and which the tobacco industry has opposed vigorously around the world.

“If you don’t want that to happen, you can slow things down,” the spokesperson said. “Or you can replace it with something less effective” — which is what SICPA believes the tobacco lobby wants.

With the Commission preparing a second feasibility study on the decision and lobbyists from all sides preparing to boost their Brussels operations, the European anti-fraud office OLAF has also made a surprise entry into the debate, throwing its support behind the tobacco companies’ model.

Package deal

At the heart of the dispute are EU moves to implement measures in last year’s revised Tobacco Products Directive that deal specifically with packaging traceability and security features. The measures are designed to prevent the counterfeiting and smuggling of cigarettes, which the Commission estimates result in €10 billion a year in lost revenue.

Under the directive, EU countries will be required by 2019 to “ensure that all unit packets of tobacco products are marked with a unique identifier” which will be “irremovably printed or affixed, indelible and not hidden or interrupted in any form.”

This high-tech marker will contain information including the date and place of manufacture, the machinery used and shipment route to the first retail outlet, as well as the invoice of payment.

The new directive also includes a measure to fight counterfeit through the application of a “tamper proof security feature, composed of visible and invisible elements” affixed to the package.

A consortium of the top four tobacco companies has developed its own “track and trace” technology to counter industry leader SICPA.

While a number of companies have expressed an interest in providing technology to help EU countries meet their tobacco packaging commitments, even tobacco lobbyists concede SICPA’s experience in tobacco and alcohol labeling is attractive to regulators.

But the tobacco companies aren’t backing down.

A consortium of the top four tobacco companies (British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco Group, Japan Tobacco International and Philip Morris International) has developed its own “track and trace” technology, called Codentify.

Tobacco companies argue that Codentify is a better option for meeting the requirements of the directive, because it is already up and running in a number of countries where the industry claims it has worked without disrupting distribution.

“The problem with SICPA is that it produces stamps with unique identifiers, but their technology does not conform with the directive,” said a lobbyist working for one of the big four tobacco companies. “Codentify provides a unique marker on the assembly line. It works.”

But a SICPA spokesperson called that claim “a pure piece of misinformation,” adding the Commission’s first feasibility study on the issue, released in May, proves SICPA’s technology meets the requirements.

“The suggestions of a ‘monopoly’ is another propaganda line,” the spokesperson said. “It seems the tobacco industry would like Codentify introduced as a single system.”

However, the European Anti-Fraud Office, known by its French acronym OLAF, has expressed caution at the prospect of SICPA being awarded the contract.

Tobacco contraband specialists at OLAF are afraid the company’s technology, which is largely unknown in Europe, may clash with the tobacco smuggling working agreements OLAF now has in place with the tobacco industry, the details of which remain secret.

OLAF investigators told POLITICO that with the smuggling agreements set to expire in 2016, this is not the right time to disrupt its working relationship with the industry. The investigators said their efforts to combat illicit tobacco trade, which includes growing black markets, rely on the input of the tobacco industry.

“This system forces tobacco companies to ‘kiss and tell’,” an OLAF investigator said. “They must provide us with intelligence for current investigations because they are objectively accountable.”

Lobbyists mobilize

The EU’s tobacco products directive was approved in December 2013, following a bitter debate over the degree of access which the Commission granted tobacco lobbyists at the early stages of the legislative process.

The commissioner overseeing the reforms, John Dalli, was removed from office in 2012 over his unreported contact with tobacco lobbyists — a controversy dubbed ‘Dalligate’.

The aspects of the directive addressing “track and trace” technology were part of a worldwide push to adopt packaging technology in a bid to end both the illicit trade and counterfeit of tobacco.

The EU and its member countries are signatories to the World Health Organization’s protocol to eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products, which requires the establishment of a “tracking and tracing system … for all tobacco products that are manufactured in or imported onto its territory.”

The Commission’s first feasibility study put forward four “track and trace” options: one closer to the Codentify technology promoted by the industry and other options which would place SICPA’s technology in a stronger position.

The Commission now wants a second report, with an official saying in a statement that this “follow-up study [had] the purpose to select one of the models (possibly with modifications and combinations)” and that it aims to go “more in detail in order to achieve a functioning system.”

The call for a second study now has both sides lobbying hard for their own technology, at an EU and a national level, while attempting to undermine each other’s proposal.

SICPA hired a high-profile tobacco lobbyist, Yves Trévilly, to further its case in France.

SICPA recently signed up to the EU Transparency Register, revealing that it had three full-time staff positions lobbying the institutions, while the four big tobacco companies all have active lobbyists and a range of industry organizations at their disposal.

SICPA also hired a high-profile tobacco lobbyist, former French political adviser Yves Trévilly, to further its case in France. Trévilly joined British American Tobacco in 2006, and became its top lobbyist in 2008 before leaving in 2012.

Tobacco lobbyists point to the fact that SICPA is being investigated by authorities in Brazil over a corruption scandal as evidence the Swiss company is not fit to take on the sensitive “track and trace” role in the EU.

However, SICPA dismisses the tobacco lobby’s campaign as an attempt to wrest control of the tracking process.

“For the tobacco industry, what happens in Europe sets a precedent in the rest of the world,” a spokesperson said. “So, whether it is independent controls or cigarette plain packaging, it appears they want to stop any change. They put a lot of effort into it.”

Meanwhile, anti-tobacco NGOs say while they are not taking sides in the clash, they are afraid the Commission might end up choosing an option which is not transparent and will not give the public access to the data collected through the track and trace process.

“We cannot argue our case on tobacco tracing because we have no data,” said Florence Berteletti, the director of the Smoke Free Partnership, an NGO. “We only have questions, not answers. We have the World Health Organization protocol in place to fight illicit tobacco trade — why don’t we use it?”

Big tobacco tries to put its stamp on new packaging

http://www.politico.eu/article/big-tobacco-stamp-packaging-labeling-technology-sicpa-codentify-counterfeit/

Cigarette lobbyists take aim at a Swiss company over high-tech anti-counterfeit technology.

MIAMI - JUNE 22:  A pack of cigarettes with the new label, "Gold Pack", is seen next to packs with the old labeling at the Quick Stop store on June 22, 2010 in Miami, Florida. Today the Food and Drug Administration law banning the use of  terms "light," "mild" and "low" tar goes into affect in the marketing and sale of cigarettes. The new boxes have replaced those terms with lighter-colored packaging for light brands and switched to terms such as "gold" and "silver" to replace "light" and "ultra-light".  (Photo by Joe Raedle/Getty Images)

MIAMI – JUNE 22: A pack of cigarettes with the new label, “Gold Pack”, is seen next to packs with the old labeling at the Quick Stop store on June 22, 2010 in Miami, Florida. Today the Food and Drug Administration law banning the use of terms “light,” “mild” and “low” tar goes into affect in the marketing and sale of cigarettes. The new boxes have replaced those terms with lighter-colored packaging for light brands and switched to terms such as “gold” and “silver” to replace “light” and “ultra-light”. (Photo by Joe Raedle/Getty Images)

Tobacco lobbyists have joined forces in a bid to stop the European Commission from signing up a Swiss company to provide advanced “track and trace” technology to combat cigarette smuggling.

The fight is intensifying at the EU level as the European Parliament prepares to debate the matter and the Commission nears a long-awaited decision on cigarette packaging.

Tobacco companies, who want to use their own anti-counterfeit measures, argue that if the Commission awards Lausanne-based printing technology firm SICPA the contract, it will be granting it a monopoly that will wreak havoc on the industry.

“If SICPA’s solution is adopted, it would lock out every other provider in the sector,” one tobacco lobbyist said, dismissing the Swiss company as a “printer of banknotes” with little experience in cigarette distribution. “It would set a very unhealthy precedent.”

But SICPA believes there is more to Big Tobacco’s fierce response than concerns about free markets. A company spokesperson said the industry is concerned that a successful campaign to track the distribution of cigarettes across Europe would harm the tobacco companies’ business interests.

“This is what is at stake: A powerful, independent ‘track and trace’ regime would make illicit tobacco trade very difficult,” said a spokesperson for SICPA, a privately owned company that has provided its technology to Brazil, Kenya and a number of U.S. states and which the tobacco industry has opposed vigorously around the world.

“If you don’t want that to happen, you can slow things down,” the spokesperson said. “Or you can replace it with something less effective” — which is what SICPA believes the tobacco lobby wants.

With the Commission preparing a second feasibility study on the decision and lobbyists from all sides preparing to boost their Brussels operations, the European anti-fraud office OLAF has also made a surprise entry into the debate, throwing its support behind the tobacco companies’ model.

Package deal

At the heart of the dispute are EU moves to implement measures in last year’s revised Tobacco Products Directive that deal specifically with packaging traceability and security features. The measures are designed to prevent the counterfeiting and smuggling of cigarettes, which the Commission estimates result in €10 billion a year in lost revenue.

Under the directive, EU countries will be required by 2019 to “ensure that all unit packets of tobacco products are marked with a unique identifier” which will be “irremovably printed or affixed, indelible and not hidden or interrupted in any form.”

This high-tech marker will contain information including the date and place of manufacture, the machinery used and shipment route to the first retail outlet, as well as the invoice of payment.

The new directive also includes a measure to fight counterfeit through the application of a “tamper proof security feature, composed of visible and invisible elements” affixed to the package.

While a number of companies have expressed an interest in providing technology to help EU countries meet their tobacco packaging commitments, even tobacco lobbyists concede SICPA’s experience in tobacco and alcohol labeling is attractive to regulators.

But the tobacco companies aren’t backing down.

A consortium of the top four tobacco companies (British American Tobacco, Imperial Tobacco Group, Japan Tobacco International and Philip Morris International) has developed its own “track and trace” technology, called Codentify.

Tobacco companies argue that Codentify is a better option for meeting the requirements of the directive, because it is already up and running in a number of countries where the industry claims it has worked without disrupting distribution.

“The problem with SICPA is that it produces stamps with unique identifiers, but their technology does not conform with the directive,” said a lobbyist working for one of the big four tobacco companies. “Codentify provides a unique marker on the assembly line. It works.”

But a SICPA spokesperson called that claim “a pure piece of misinformation,” adding the Commission’s first feasibility study on the issue, released in May, proves SICPA’s technology meets the requirements.

“The suggestions of a ‘monopoly’ is another propaganda line,” the spokesperson said. “It seems the tobacco industry would like Codentify introduced as a single system.”

However, the European Anti-Fraud Office, known by its French acronym OLAF, has expressed caution at the prospect of SICPA being awarded the contract.

Tobacco contraband specialists at OLAF are afraid the company’s technology, which is largely unknown in Europe, may clash with the tobacco smuggling working agreements OLAF now has in place with the tobacco industry, the details of which remain secret.

OLAF investigators told POLITICO that with the smuggling agreements set to expire in 2016, this is not the right time to disrupt its working relationship with the industry. The investigators said their efforts to combat illicit tobacco trade, which includes growing black markets, rely on the input of the tobacco industry.

“This system forces tobacco companies to ‘kiss and tell’,” an OLAF investigator said. “They must provide us with intelligence for current investigations because they are objectively accountable.”

Lobbyists mobilize

The EU’s tobacco products directive was approved in December 2013, following a bitter debate over the degree of access which the Commission granted tobacco lobbyists at the early stages of the legislative process.

The commissioner overseeing the reforms, John Dalli, was removed from office in 2012 over his unreported contact with tobacco lobbyists — a controversy dubbed ‘Dalligate’.

The aspects of the directive addressing “track and trace” technology were part of a worldwide push to adopt packaging technology in a bid to end both the illicit trade and counterfeit of tobacco.

The EU and its member countries are signatories to the World Health Organization’s protocol to eliminate illicit trade in tobacco products, which requires the establishment of a “tracking and tracing system … for all tobacco products that are manufactured in or imported onto its territory.”

The Commission’s first feasibility study put forward four “track and trace” options: one closer to the Codentify technology promoted by the industry and other options which would place SICPA’s technology in a stronger position.

The Commission now wants a second report, with an official saying in a statement that this “follow-up study [had] the purpose to select one of the models (possibly with modifications and combinations)” and that it aims to go “more in detail in order to achieve a functioning system.”

The call for a second study now has both sides lobbying hard for their own technology, at an EU and a national level, while attempting to undermine each other’s proposal.

SICPA recently signed up to the EU Transparency Register, revealing that it had three full-time staff positions lobbying the institutions, while the four big tobacco companies all have active lobbyists and a range of industry organizations at their disposal.

SICPA also hired a high-profile tobacco lobbyist, former French political adviser Yves Trévilly, to further its case in France. Trévilly joined British American Tobacco in 2006, and became its top lobbyist in 2008 before leaving in 2012.

Tobacco lobbyists point to the fact that SICPA is being investigated by authorities in Brazil over a corruption scandal as evidence the Swiss company is not fit to take on the sensitive “track and trace” role in the EU.

However, SICPA dismisses the tobacco lobby’s campaign as an attempt to wrest control of the tracking process.

“For the tobacco industry, what happens in Europe sets a precedent in the rest of the world,” a spokesperson said. “So, whether it is independent controls or cigarette plain packaging, it appears they want to stop any change. They put a lot of effort into it.”

Meanwhile, anti-tobacco NGOs say while they are not taking sides in the clash, they are afraid the Commission might end up choosing an option which is not transparent and will not give the public access to the data collected through the track and trace process.

“We cannot argue our case on tobacco tracing because we have no data,” said Florence Berteletti, the director of the Smoke Free Partnership, an NGO. “We only have questions, not answers. We have the World Health Organization protocol in place to fight illicit tobacco trade — why don’t we use it?”

British American to test tobacco/e-cigarette hybrid

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/health/british-american-to-test/2272958.html

LONDON: British American Tobacco, the world’s No. 2 cigarette maker, will test a hybrid product that uses tobacco and e-cigarette technology next week in an unspecified European market, a senior executive said on Wednesday.

The product, called iFuse, will make use of the company’s Kent brand, and be sold in a market where Kent cigarettes are popular. Executives declined to say which market that will be.

The first of its kind, iFuse is a “game-changer,” according to Kingsley Wheaton, BAT’s managing director of “next generation products”.

(Reporting by Martinne Geller in London, editing by Louise Heavens)
– Reuters

Plain Packaging – International Overview

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Philip Morris: Reading The Smoke Signals In 2015 – Part 1

http://seekingalpha.com/article/3592586-philip-morris-reading-the-smoke-signals-in-2015-part-1

Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. (More…)I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Summary

Roughly one year after my series on international tobacco, I have decided to write an update.

I will focus primarily on the performance of Philip Morris versus its three largest international competitors.

In the first part of the 2015 series, I will study the competitive dynamics in Western Europe.

Due to popular demand, I have decided to write another installment of my 2014-published series on international tobacco called ‘Reading the Smoke Signals’. As customary, I will focus mostly on the international arena (excluding the U.S. and China), because this is the primary battleground for Philip Morris (NYSE:PM) and its largest competitors: British American Tobacco (NYSEMKT:BTI), Japan Tobacco (OTCPK:JAPAY) and Imperial Tobacco (OTCQX:ITYBY). This article will focus on the relative performances delivered by these four companies in some of the different geographic areas in which they compete. I will also look at some of the important structural developments, including the increased pace of consolidation seen year to date. Since Philip Morris is the international market share leader, this company in particular is the focus of the article. In this first installment, I will take a look at the competitive landscape in Western Europe.

Philip Morris in Western Europe

Western Europe is a mature cigarette market with high average prices as a result of high excise tax levels. It also has an increasingly strict regulatory environment with more regulation in sight, as the new EU tobacco products directive is mandated for adoption by EU member states in the spring of 2016 at the latest. Profitability in this region is above average as a result of high average income levels and high average tobacco prices at retail. Philip Morris is the undisputed share leader in the region, due in important part to Marlboro’s long-time leadership and continued resilience. The new Marlboro 2.0 architecture appears to have benefited the brand’s consumer perception and its market share has continuously showed improvements over the past 4 years or so. Marlboro market share in the region was up to 19.3% for 2014 and has increased further to 19.4% as of September 2015. That is an important indication of PM’s ability to keep the brand relevant despite its reliance in part on an aging demographic.

The pace of volume declines in the EU market overall accelerated during the economic crisis in 2008. Next to economic reasons like pressure on personal incomes and high unemployment rates, other important factors contributing to this pressure have been increasing tax rates, an increased prevalence of illicit trade, e-cigarette consumption and increasing regulation because of health concerns. In 2014, however, the industry saw significant moderation in volume declines as a result of the decreased popularity of e-cigarettes, a decrease in illicit trade and some economic improvements as well.

Market share for Philip Morris in the region was up to 39.8% for 2014 and to 39.9% as of September 2015. Next to Marlboro, PM relies on brands like L&M (up 0.1pp to 7.1% share) and Chesterfield (up 0.3pp to 5.8% share) as its most important volume drivers. In markets like Italy and the Czech Republic, it also has ownership of local brands like Diana and Red & White, respectively, that have generally witnessed declines as consumers gradually move to international brands. Philip Morris’s performance has been strong in recent years, as it continues to gain share in many of the region’s most important markets. Its market shares were up during 2014 in all of the following markets: France (up 0.8pp to 41%), Germany (up 0.4pp to 36.6%), Italy (up 1.8pp to 54.9%), Poland (up 1.9pp to 40.1%) and Spain (up 0.9pp to 32.1%). Marlboro’s performance was strong primarily in France and Spain, while L&M drove performance in Poland and Germany. Improvements in Italy were driven by share gains delivered by Chesterfield, which continued to derive benefits from its price repositioning in this market. Market share improvements were reflected in PM’s overall volume improvement of +0.1% during 2014, while the total cigarette market was lower by -3.1%.

The trends seen during 2014 have largely continued during the recently reported 9M period of 2015, with further share improvements seen in France, Germany and Spain. In Italy, the positive performance of 2014 was reversed due to share declines seen in Marlboro as a result of price increases (from €5 to €5.20 a pack), with weakness in brand Philip Morris as well (which includes the morphed local brand Diana), as a result of increased competition in the low-price segment.

British American Tobacco in Western Europe

British American Tobacco has been locked into a battle for the No. 2 share position in Western Europe with Japan Tobacco for a number of years now. BAT appears to be losing this battle when looking at current data. British American’s volume in the Western European segment was down by -5.88% to roughly 112 billion sticks during 2014, while Japan Tobacco’s volume was up slightly by 0.09% to 111.4 billion sticks (for comparison: PM’s was 185.2 billion). In 2014, BAT performed well in markets like France, the Benelux, the U.K., Spain and Poland. Weaker performances were delivered in markets like Italy, Denmark, Switzerland and Germany. Weakness seen in Italy during 2014 appears to have improved notably during the first half of 2015, although the company’s reporting does not really allow for great market share insights.

BAT’s Rothmans brand continues to amaze in terms of volume improvements and added 10 billion sticks during 2014 to its 2013 volume of 26 billion sticks globally (roughly +38.5%). This brand’s strong growth benefits BAT’s European performance in certain markets as well. Italy is one of the markets, where the company is deriving benefits from the performance of this brand, which was up to 4.1% share of market in H1-2015, up from 0.2% in H1-2013 and 2.4% in H1-2014. Rothmans is probably the fastest growing cigarette brand globally (out of those with notable size of course) as a result of its roll-out into new markets and the strong performance of innovations like convertible cigarettes. BAT’s share in Italy stabilized at 20.2% for H1 of 2015 as a result of the performance displayed by Rothmans in this market.

Romania continues to be a BAT stronghold with total share up to roughly 54% in Aug-2015 versus 53.8% during 2013, largely as a result of higher share for Global Drive Brands (GDB) like Kent, Dunhill and Pall Mall. Pressure on BAT’s German share of market during 2014 seems to have been reversed during H1 of 2015, with important brands like Pall Mall and Lucky Strike bouncing back and rising above their shares of last year. This development pushed BAT’s share back up to 19.5% (June 2015) versus 19.4% for the same period last year. In France, BAT’s share has been on the rise thanks to strength displayed by Lucky Strike, with that brand’s share up a full share point to 8.3% in July 2015 and total BAT share up to 17.6% in the same month (17% during 2014).

The most important development in the area of European tobacco M&A was conducted by British American, when it acquired TDR a couple of months ago. The acquisition price totaled €550 million including debt, roughly 12.5x EBITDA of €44 million (2014), which is broadly in line with historic tobacco buy-out multiples. It is not a particularly large acquisition and I am not very familiar with the business in question. TDR apparently has a leading market position in the Balkan country of Croatia (once part of Yugoslavia) and a relevant presence in the neighboring countries Bosnia and Serbia. I expect BAT will use the acquisition, which includes a manufacturing facility in Croatia, as a platform to further develop its business and brands in Central Europe.

Japan Tobacco in Western Europe

Japan Tobacco saw broad-based market share gains in many Western European markets during 2014 with important markets like France up to 20.8% share (+0.8ppt) and Spain to 21.7% (+0.7ppt), largely driven by strengths seen in brands like Winston and Camel. The good performances delivered in these markets were continued during H1-2015 with France up to 21.1% and Spain up to 22%. Market share in Poland improved further as well and was up to 16.4% during H1-2015. Other good performances were delivered in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, the Benelux countries, Greece, Ireland, Poland and Switzerland.

Performance in Italy apparently was less favorable, which continued during H1-2015 because market share dipped to 20% during that period, even though the company’s newly launched Benson & Hedges value offering saw good growth. Austria was a weak performer as well as market share dropped to 32% (down 0.2ppt), with further declines to 31.4% during H1-2015. In the U.K., the company continued to show resilience by widening its leading position, with Amber Leaf further consolidated as the No. 1 fine-cut brand in this market, Sterling is still No.1 in cigarettes and total company share up to 41.6% as of June 2015. I consider the performance of JT in the U.K., especially admirable because it is being achieved largely through the continued strength of local brands, thereby defying the negative growth seen in national brands in most other cigarette markets. In the U.K., the tobacco market is largely divided between Imperial Tobacco and Japan Tobacco, with share gains made by Philip Morris and BAT apparently primarily at the expense of Imperial Tobacco.

In Romania, JT also continues to perform well with its share of market up to 25.2% due to strength in Winston, Sobranie and Benson & Hedges. It has a decent No. 2 position in this market after BAT, which has roughly half the market.

Imperial Tobacco in Western Europe

Imperial Tobacco meanwhile relies to an important degree on core markets like France, Germany, Spain and the U.K. for a large part of its European volumes. This company is extremely reluctant with providing data on market share performance, which I attribute to their largely unfavorable track record on this metric. I believe the company lost market share in all four of its core European markets, which is due at least in part to their inferior brand portfolio which contains mostly local brands. Their historic strength in fine-cut tobacco has also been less advantageous than one might expect to be the case in austerity-stricken Europe, because the other companies have leveraged their cigarette brands to launch fine-cut offerings as well.

Imperial Tobacco has been actively trying to gain share of the Italian market with its John Player Special brand, which I believe is the factor primarily responsible for the changed dynamics in the lower-priced segment of this market. Imperial gained share in Italy during 2014 from a modest level. This positive momentum was continued during H1 of 2015 with premium brand Davidoff also doing well. Other gains were delivered in Greece, the Nordics (in snus tobacco), Portugal and the Czech Republic. Share declines were registered in markets like the Benelux and Germany (in fine cut), with share developments apparently stabilizing in Austria. The developments in Imperial’s most important European markets largely continued in the same direction during 2015. The Benelux countries, which are also important fine-cut markets for Imperial, apparently showed more stabilized share performances.

Market share was reportedly down in the U.K. during H1-2015. Interestingly, the company reports having a ‘leading position’ in the U.K., but in my opinion they now trail Japan Tobacco in this market.

The U.K. is one of the most important European markets for Imperial Tobacco, because it has long held a significant market share there, although this position has been eroded somewhat by PM and BAT gaining share with Marlboro and Rothmans, respectively.

IMT does not provide extensive volume numbers either, but its global volume was down strongly during its fiscal year 2014, namely by -7.26% to 294 billion sticks. This was due in part to an inventory realignment program that ended during the year, as could be seen by the moderation in its reported decline to -2.77% for 9M-2015 (the underlying decline was -6% though). I strongly expect this company’s organic growth will continue to underperform its international peers, although it has in the past year benefited from its lower-than-average exposure to emerging market currencies and the brand acquisition in the US.

Conclusion

Philip Morris and Japan Tobacco continued to outperform in the Western Europe region during 2014 and H1-2015, with British American and Imperial showing significant weakness during FY 2015, but apparently showing some improvements during H1-2015. Since PM, BAT and JT have all reported significant gains in important markets like Germany, France, Spain and the U.K. over the past years, I strongly suspect Imperial Tobacco is losing ground rather quickly in these countries.

Imperial Tobacco is a company that has conducted a lot of acquisitions during the past two decades or so; its significant presence in France and Spain is the result of its 2008 acquisition of Altadis (which was created out of those two countries’ former state tobacco monopolies). It, therefore, relies extensively on local brands in these markets, which are very consistently being outcompeted by the international brands owned by PM, BAT and JT. In Germany, Imperial Tobacco also has a strong presence as a result of its 2002 acquisition of Reemtsma, which includes a strong presence in the fine-cut tobacco category. This is a very large segment of the German tobacco market overall, which should have served Imperial well since it is a fine-cut specialist, but the other companies have successfully taken share in this category as well. In my opinion, therefore, Philip Morris and Japan Tobacco have shown themselves to be the best operators in Western Europe.

In the upcoming Part 2 of my ‘Reading the Smoke Signals 2015′ series, I will take a look at the performance of the international tobacco companies in another geographic region, so keep an eye out!

Editor’s Note: This article discusses one or more securities that do not trade on a major U.S. exchange. Please be aware of the risks associated with these stocks.

Revealed: how ‘big tobacco’ used EU rules to win health delay

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/11/tobacco-eu-delay

Cigarette companies pushed EC’s Better Regulation agenda to secure three-year moratorium on plain packaging

Marlboro Menthol cigarettes in new packaging in Australia. Photograph: Bloomberg/Bloomberg via Getty Images

Marlboro Menthol cigarettes in new packaging in Australia. Photograph: Bloomberg/Bloomberg via Getty Images

The world’s largest tobacco companies were instrumental in promoting Europe-wide, pro-business regulations that they used to delay health initiatives.

Analysis carried out by the University of Bath’s Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) has found that the companies played a key role in pushing the European commission’s Better Regulation agenda, which places business interests at the heart of policy drafting. They then used the new laws to block and delay a series of major health reforms, including UK introduction of plain packaging.

Under the terms of the Better Regulation agenda, which internal tobacco industry documents reveal was enthusiastically supported by British American Tobacco, European governments, including the UK, must conduct public consultations and impact assessments when introducing laws that affect business. The tobacco companies took advantage of these laws, using third parties and fake grassroots campaigns to swamp the consultations on anti-smoking initiatives such as the introduction of plain packaging. In addition, they were highly selective in what they submitted. All failed to include evidence – disclosed as a result of historic legal action – that they knew branded packaging was crucial to the marketing of their products, something they consistently denied in public.

For example, a document drawn up by Marlboro manufacturer Philip Morris in 1970 explained how pack recognition research was conducted by using hidden cameras on unsuspecting consumers in stores. It states: “As a prospective customer entered the area, he broke the photoelectric beam, immediately setting in motion the concealed camera which recorded the movement of his eyes and the final selection he made. From the thousands of films, the designers and advertising men were able to determine which package, which design and what combination of colours had the most appeal.”

 

Leaked documents show that Philip Morris identified the Better Regulation laws as a key weapon in its battle to derail the 2014 EU tobacco products directive which introduced large-scale health warnings on cigarette packets and a ban on flavoured cigarettes and packs of 10 –both popular marketing initiatives with young smokers. The tobacco giant employed more than 160 lobbyists and spent ¤1.25bn opposing the directive’s introduction. The European commission department responsible for drawing up the directive was swamped with 85,000 submissions. Many of the claims that they made were based on dubious evidence. According to the TCRG analysis of the submissions, “the research was of significantly lower quality than research supporting the measure. For example, the tobacco companies’ arguments were not supported by any peer-reviewed journal articles about standardised packaging.”

Nevertheless, the tobacco giants’ tactics resulted in a three-year delay in the introduction of plain packaging in the UK. Anna Gilmore, Professor of Public Health and Director of the TCRG, said their analysis highlighted the need for full transparency when it came to public consultations.

“The tobacco companies played a key role in implementing Better Regulation, anticipating that it would help them delay, block or weaken public health legislation,” Gilmore said.

“They have now gone on to exploit it to prevent life-saving regulations. They are flooding consultations with massive numbers of responses to give a totally misleading impression of opposition to public health policies. They then cite wholly misleading evidence that they have effectively manufactured to support their case.”

Brussels must resist lobbying by the tobacco industry

http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/brussels-must-resist-lobbying-by-the-tobacco-industry-1.2385730?mode=print&ot=example.AjaxPageLayout.ot

Emily O’Reilly

Lobbyists do a very straightforward job. They try to influence legislators to do things, or not to do things, that affect the bottom line of the people who pay them.

In 2012, the European Commission did something likely to affect the bottom line of the tobacco industry. It proposed a new Tobacco Products Directive aimed at reducing smoking rates across Europe, especially among young people.

And that was the starting pistol for hundreds of tobacco industry-hired lobbyists to fan out across Brussels and the member states, in a bid to curtail the potential commercial damage the new law could cause them worldwide.

Brussels is now a legislative powerhouse, and thus a hive of lobbying activity. Every morning, dozens queue for access passes in the European Parliament, while across the town, formal meetings fill diaries and countless informal meetings take place over coffee, lunch and dinner, as they seek a toehold on some part of the legislative ladder that will enable them to effect some change favourable to their clients.

Most of the biggest corporations in the world, from Google to British American Tobacco, to Shell and BP, have established a presence in the cobblestone streets around the EU quarter. With that has come an increasing stream of former EU officials going through the public service door and into a frequently lucrative private one. Highly prized insider intelligence and access is the currency that seeps through much of the legislative work of the EU.

By the time the Tobacco Products Directive finally passed into law two years later, the European Parliament, Commission and Council had been subjected to one of the most intense lobbying campaigns witnessed by the three institutions. It was, one commentator said, “the most lobbied dossier in the history of the EU institutions”.

And while the directive that emerged was generally well received as a significant contribution towards tobacco control and the safeguarding of public health, due to the hard work of many working on the issue, it was also clear that the lobbyists had won some victories along the way.

A softening of a plain packaging clause – meaning that it was left to member states to introduce such a measure if they chose – led to the current case taken by Japan Tobacco against the Irish Government’s decision to do just that.

The UK is being similarly sued by Philip Morris and British American Tobacco, and it in turn has brought a case to the ECJ to get clarity on certain aspects of the directive. Issues such as intellectual property and the right to free speech form part of the legal challenge.

The intent of the lobbyists was twofold. One, obviously, was to water down the original commission proposal, the other was to delay its passage to a point where perhaps a more favourable political climate might further dilute the bottom line impact of the proposed measures.

Now publicly available tobacco industry documents and evidence from MEPs and officials, testify to a massively well-funded and highly sophisticated campaign.

The approach was tailored, with bespoke approaches for individuals, institutions or ministers depending on cultural or political sensitivities and susceptibilities.

No argument was either too alarmist or too cynical to be discarded, whether wholesale unemployment of French tabac owners, or the cost to creaking health services of people actually living longer. The sophisticated use of “front groups” was another favourite tactic.

Strange things happened along the way, including the sudden and strange departure of the then EU health commissioner John Dalli. This threatened to derail the whole process ahead of the strongly anti-tobacco Irish presidency. Even stranger were break-ins to the Brussels offices of three anti-smoking NGOs which had material swiped from their databases.

As European Ombudsman, my involvement began when I received a series of complaints claiming that the European Commission had not been as transparent as it should be when it came to its dealings with tobacco lobbyists.

The complaints alleged that details of certain meetings had not been proactively published and that this was not in compliance with the 2003 UN Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which the EU had signed up to in 2005. Indeed the commission itself played a leading role in pushing for this convention under then EU health commissioner David Byrne.

That convention is strikingly clear in its refusal to see the tobacco industry as a “normal” commercial interest to which “normal” rules of commercial engagement and commercial protection should apply.

Using highly-charged vocabulary, including the words “epidemic” and “devastating”, the industry is characterised as a pernicious one, severely damaging to global public health, and one to which as little quarter as possible should be given by governments and regulators.

Alongside other non-binding guidelines, the UN convention instructs all member states who signed up to it, and all EU institutions, to limit their interactions with the tobacco industry and to make any such interactions as transparent and as accountable as possible.

There is no doubt but that the commission was heavily lobbied and by extremely smart people – including lawyers – who used a belt and braces approach when it came to attempts to dissuade it from certain lines of action.

An examination of documents which outlined the industry approach showed that one tactic was to – in effect – shake the commission’s confidence when it came to the legality of certain crucial directive elements.

No institution relishes a trip to the courts to account for its work, and the lobbyists were well aware that this was a potentially fruitful tactic.

It would appear that, at the very least, it may have worked to slow down the passage of the directive.

My inquiry included an inspection of the commission’s files. We found that the Barroso Commission had not sought to conceal meetings, but that details of certain meetings were revealed only when an access, or FOI, request was made.

We further found that while the lead commission department, the directorate general for health, did proactively release details of all its contacts with the tobacco lobby, other directorates general did not.

The most interesting finding perhaps was that officials, when asked, revealed that they did not consider contacts with lawyers representing the industry to be meetings with lawyers acting potentially as lobbyists.

At the very least, this failure to see lawyers as potential lobbyists was naïve.

The most cursory examination of lobbying methodology, and particularly when it comes to regulatory affairs, shows how valuable lawyers are to the process.

Most websites of the more influential lobbying firms in Brussels demonstrate a proud – and far from hidden – showcasing of their hiring of former commission and other EU-insider lawyers, clearly valued for their knowledge of how the system works, and, no doubt, of how it can be tweaked in their new employer’s interests.

This so called “revolving door” phenomenon has been the basis of another ongoing inquiry by my office.

My recommendations to the commission, published earlier this week, are simple: that all of the directorates general should proactively release details of contacts with the tobacco industry, just as the directorate general health does, and should recognise lawyers as potential lobbyists and not as a separate caste.

It must be noted that the EU Commission in power since November 2014 under the presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker has made several positive steps towards more lobbying transparency. This is an example to other EU institutions, and indeed is now at a level of transparency better than most EU member states.

However the commission is the EU executive, it has great responsibilities and must lead by example.

To some observers, all of this might appear either abstract or high-minded. But recent revelations, for example, about Volkswagen’s deliberate concealment of the actual emission rates of their cars, shows the real-world cost of regulatory failure.

Over time, details may well emerge of how lobbyists for the car industry also worked to try to water down public-interest initiatives to safeguard the environment and public health.

How many more lives might be saved or public health further safeguarded if the Tobacco Directive had been even stricter, if clever lobbyists hadn’t been able to nibble around its edges?

The commission says that it believes it has been faithful to the UN convention and that in any event, the guidelines are not legally binding.

The former, in my view, is not the case, and the latter should not matter.

I do believe the commission has the best interests of citizens at heart and, while full of intelligent, hard-working people, I also believe it needs to engage those citizens more fully in its work by alerting them to the forces that seek to steer the commission in a direction in which perhaps it should not go.

The more transparency there is around lobbying, the more that an engaged civil society can work with dedicated public servants in the EU, to ensure that clever, well-resourced industry agents do not upset the balance between the safeguarding of a public interest and the right of an industry to safeguard its profits.

Emily O’Reilly is European Ombudsman