Clear The Air News Tobacco Blog Rotating Header Image

Plain Packaging

Uruguay defeats Philip Morris test case lawsuit

Uruguay has won a landmark lawsuit against Philip Morris International, which was suing the South American country for its strict regulations on smoking in what was seen as a test case for the tobacco industry.

Friday’s decision sets an important precedent for other countries considering implementing similar legislation, with anti-tobacco campaigners accusing Philip Morris of using litigation to scare others from following Uruguay’s example.

“The attempts of the tobacco companies have been roundly rejected,” said Uruguay’s President Tabaré Vázquez, an oncologist who has made the fight against tobacco one of his flagship policies. “It is not acceptable to prioritise commercial considerations over the fundamental right to health and life,” he added in a televised address to the nation.

In its lawsuit at the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, which marked the first time a tobacco group had taken on a country in an international court, Philip Morris argued that Uruguay had violated terms of a bilateral investment treaty with Switzerland, where it has its headquarters in Lausanne.

The world’s biggest tobacco company — whose annual revenues of more than $80bn across 180 countries far exceed Uruguay’s gross domestic product of closer to $50bn — claimed that a 2009 anti-tobacco law damaged its intellectual property rights and hit sales.

Philip Morris — which has lost lawsuits in Norway, Australia and the UK — opposed the Uruguayan anti-tobacco law’s requirements that graphic health warnings cover 80 per cent of both sides of cigarette packets, and that brands have a single image, thereby prohibiting sub-brands such as Marlboro Red or Marlboro Gold. That forced Philip Morris to withdraw seven of its 12 brands from shops in Uruguay.

“We’ve never questioned Uruguay’s authority to protect public health,” said Marc Firestone, general counsel at Philip Morris, who clarified that the company had been complying with the regulations at issue in the case for the past seven years. “The arbitration concerned an important, but unusual, set of facts that called for clarification under international law, which the parties have now received,” he added.

Some observers have remarked on the apparent irony that in 2013 Uruguay legalised marijuana, which is due to start being sold in pharmacies this month, while at the same time it is clamping down on tobacco. But others say that Uruguay’s trailblazing efforts to regulate marijuana and tobacco are consistent, arguing that both industries are insufficiently controlled.

“This is a major victory for the people of Uruguay — and it shows countries everywhere that they can stand up to tobacco companies and win,” said former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who provided Uruguay’s lawsuit with financial support. “No country should ever be intimidated by the threat of a tobacco company lawsuit, and this case will help embolden more nations to take actions that will save lives,” he added.

According to health ministry figures, the number of Uruguayans who smoke had fallen to 22 per cent of the population by 2014, from 35 per cent in 2005. The number of young smokers fell to 8 per cent in 2014, from 23 per cent in 2006, when Uruguay became the first country in the region to ban smoking in enclosed public spaces.

Phillip Morris loses tough-on-tobacco lawsuit in Uruguay

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pmi-uruguay-lawsuit-idUSKCN0ZO2LZ

The World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) ruled in favor of Uruguay on Friday in a suit filed by Philip Morris International seeking compensation for economic damages caused by the nation’s anti-tobacco measures.

Uruguay imposed a ban on smoking in public spaces in 2006, as it raised taxes on tobacco products and forced firms to include large warnings and graphic images including diseased lungs and rotting teeth on cigarette packages. It also banned the use of the words “light” and “mild” from cigarette packs to try to dispel smokers’ misguided beliefs that the products are safer.

“The health measures we implemented for controlling tobacco usage and for protecting the health of our people have been expressly recognized as legitimate and also adopted as part of the sovereign power of our republic,” Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez said in a televised speech.

Vazquez, an oncologist, helped spearhead the measures during his first term in office from 2005 to 2010.

In a lengthy decision published on Friday, the ICSID said it had ruled to dismiss Philip Morris’ demand that the regulations be withdrawn, or not applied to the company, or that it be paid $22 million in damages instead.

It ordered the tobacco company to pay Uruguay $7 million and to cover “all the fees and expenses of the Tribunal and ICSID’s administrative fees and expenses.”

Phillip Morris said it respected the tribunal’s decision.

“We’ve never questioned Uruguay’s authority to protect public health, and this case wasn’t about broad issues of tobacco policy,” Marc Firestone, Philip Morris International senior vice president and general counsel, said in a statement.

“The arbitration concerned an important, but unusual, set of facts that called for clarification under international law,” added Firestone.

The tobacco company said that it would like to meet with Uruguay’s government, to explore regulatory frameworks that would enable smokers “in the country to have informed access to reduced-risk alternatives to smoking.”

Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), the oldest anti-tobacco organization in the United States, applauded Uruguay for winning the case, but said Phillip Morris “accomplished its primary goal.”

Phillip Morris “will no doubt shed some public crocodile tears, but their main goal in launching the suit has been realized, six years and millions of dollars have been spent defending a nondiscriminatory law that was intended purely to protect public health,” said Laurent Huber, executive director for ASH.

“This has already resulted in regulatory chill in other countries, preventing tobacco legislation that would have saved lives,” Huber said.

(Reporting by Anthony Esposito and Malena Castaldi; Writing by Anthony Esposito; Editing by Tom Brown)

Philip Morris and Uruguay ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7

Download (PDF, 3.36MB)

Tobacco firms’ tax bill nears €500m ahead of plain packaging ban – report

Tobacco companies have seen their tax bill surge in the opening five months of the year as the industry has been accused of stocking up on branded cigarettes.

http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/tobacco-firms-tax-bill-nears-500m-ahead-of-plain-packaging-ban-report-34864203.html

According to a report in the Irish Daily Mail, tobacco firms have shelled out almost €500m in tax in the opening months of the year, which represents an 81pc increase on the same period last year.

The increased tax spend comes ahead of the imminent plain packaging ban. However, companies will be allowed to sell off whatever remaining stock they have left – branded or otherwise up until May 2017.

The latest figures from the Central Statistics Office show a major spike in the volume of cigarettes that are being imported into the country too.

During the opening quarter of the year 600 extra tonnes of tobacco were brought in.

Legislation that will see plain packaging introduced is being used as a method to deter smokers and children from being enticed by branding.

Anti-smoking groups have accused the industry of stockpiling branded cigarettes to get children hooked on them ahead of the looming ban.

Revenue has been contacted for comment by Independent.ie.

Plain packaging bill passes second reading

https://nz.news.yahoo.com/top-stories/a/31957689/plain-packaging-bill-passes-second-reading/#page1

The bill that will force cigarettes to be sold in plain packets is back in parliament and on track to become law.

It passed its second reading on Thursday after being on hold since 2014.

The government last month confirmed it was going to put it through, and unveiled the proposed new brown-green packaging which is similar to that used in Australia.

Prime Minister John Key said at the time plain packages could be on the shelves early next year.

The government first mooted plain packaging back in 2012, the year Australia introduced it, and the bill passed its first reading in February 2014.

It went to a select committee, which supported it, but the government didn’t want to take it any further at that time because it was worried about the possibility of costly legal challenges from big multi-national tobacco companies.

The Australian government was being sued at the time, but in December last year legal action by Philip Morris failed.

Australia is still waiting for the outcome of a challenge to its plain packaging laws that is being dealt with by the World Trade Organisation.

Despite that, the government decided to put the bill through its remaining stages.

It passed its second reading 108-13, with NZ First and ACT opposing it.

NZ First’s position is that the government should ban tobacco rather than meddle with the sale of a legal product, and it doesn’t believe plain packaging will work.

ACT leader David Seymour said the impact of plain packaging in Australia had been minimal.

“Every company wants to have its own brand so it can compete with other companies, that’s perfectly understandable,” he said.

The bill still has to pass its committee and third reading stages to become law.

It’s estimated that between 4500 and 5000 New Zealanders die from smoking-related illnesses each year.

About 15 per cent of adult New Zealanders smoke. The figure for Maori is 35 per cent and for Pacific people it’s 22 per cent

Getting personal over all that poisoning

http://www.stuff.co.nz/southland-times/opinion/81490107/getting-personal-over-all-that-poisoning

EDITORIAL: The shills of Big Tobacco are a legitimate target for anger.

MP Marama Fox had scope for withering reproach at a toxic industry in her televised debate with Dr Axel Gietz, who was here to emphasise the trademark entitlements in the face of the Government’s plans to introduce tougher plain packaging requirements.

She was doing fine until she fell into a trap of getting indulgently personal.

She called called him a peddler of death; one who profits from the misery of others.

That wasn’t the trap. It was personal, yes, but not indefensibly so. Anybody up for denying that he does?

No, the trap was upscaling things, perhaps because it felt so righteously pleasing to keep going. She called Gietz a corporate executioner and trotted out a Nazi comparison to cast him as akin to Hitler’s propagandist Joseph Goebbels, — who was also a German doctor, see?

How many people would have heard that and thought, immediately, of Godwin’s Law — that the longer a discussion goes on, the greater the risk some clod will bring out a Hitler/Nazi comparison. The implication is that generally his is where things have deteriorated to the point where sensible people should tune out.

As it happens, Mike Godwin didn’t take the view that there are no valid lessons to be drawn from understanding Nazi methodology. If anything his intent was more protective; that careless comparisons debase legitimate ones.

Was Fox’s comparison legitimate? What matters more is that it was so very unhelpful to her cause, allowing Gietz to adopt an air of aggrieved dignity and turning what should be a debate on law and morality into an inquiry into manners.

His message was essentially that the industry’s right to make a legal buck demands huge compensation if, after so many years of deceit on its part and indolence on ours, society truly commits itself to put the brakes on all that death and disease.

Which is fatuous nonsense. Every country has the sovereign right to protect the health of its people. The industry cannot plausibly present itself as an honest player, surprised and disappointed to discover, only now, that its product is pure poison that does unspeakable harm. And then contend that, even so, its business rights are somehow no less sanctified than human life.

Industry-funded International Tax and Investment Center responds to criticism by attempting to muddy the waters

The tobacco industry is under attack. In just two weeks, in May 2016, its tactic of challenging any law that threatens its profits, took a big hit. The arbitration panel, that tobacco giant Philip Morris International (PMI) had hoped would overturn standardised packaging legislation in Australia, published its full ruling that the company’s self-serving claims were inadmissible. Just days later, all four major tobacco companies lost their challenges against both the European Union’s Tobacco Products Directive and standardised packaging legislation in the UK.

This means that from 20 May 2017 EU member states must ensure that health warnings cover 65% of the tobacco pack and are free to introduce standardised packaging for tobacco products. The UK, France and Ireland, which have already enacted standardised packaging legislation, will now go ahead with this brand removal. Further afield Canada, New Zealand, Hungary and Norway are due to follow suit and other countries which have expressed an interest will be buoyed by the way the industry’s legal and trade challenges to plain packs are being soundly rejected. The World Health Organization’s (WHO) slogan for World No Tobacco Day 2016 was “Get Ready for Plain Packaging” recognising that the removal of branded tobacco packaging is “going global.”

Each jurisdiction to consider standardised packaging legislation has received sustained attacks from tobacco companies, using both their own voices and those of third parties which they fund. By commissioning and publicising research reports and opinions from seemingly independent experts, tobacco companies have created not only the impression of a large network of opposition but of an illusory body of evidence, particularly in relation to the industry argument that standardised packaging will increase the illicit tobacco trade.

PMI private documents, leaked to Action on Smoking and Health (UK), revealed that “broad third-party media engagement” and “high profile opinion pieces” would be used to raise awareness of such arguments among “decision makers and the general public” as part of its attempt to prevent standardised packaging in the UK. These documents also revealed that PMI intended to use the International Tax and Investment Centre (ITIC) as one of its key “media messengers”. Since 2012, PMI has paid ITIC (in collaboration with global advisory firm, Oxford Economics) to produce annual reports on the illicit trade in Asia. These claimed that illicit trade is increasing in the region but have been accused of being methodologically flawed. When publicly available routine data was used in an attempt to replicate ITIC’s findings in Hong Kong, illicit levels were found to be under half of what ITIC had estimated.

Key to the industry’s use of third parties is its attempt to shift the paradigm by presenting third parties as ‘independent experts’ and their research as ‘trustworthy and rigorous’ while simultaneously positioning public health academics as ‘advocates’ and ‘zealots’ and their research as ‘advocacy’. This presentation of corporate pawns as informed moderates producing quality work and public health researchers as misguided fundamentalists producing poor quality work is a public relations tactic employed for decades by corporations in relation to environmental and health issues.

Over the last few weeks this tactic has been adopted by the tobacco industry third party, ITIC, in a series of letters sent to Non-Governmental Organisations (South East Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA), ASH (UK), EU SmokeFree Partnership), the University of Bath in the UK, and the Editors of Tobacco Control, all of whom had criticised ITIC’s activities, some in letters, reports and webpages. ITIC’s letters made three inter-related claims, each of which we explore in the paragraphs below.

First, that public health research should be seen as advocacy while, by contrast, ITIC’s research (none of which appears to be peer-reviewed) should be seen as high quality. For example, in his letter to the University of Bath the President of ITIC, Daniel Witt, claimed: “We have become increasingly concerned about how the integrity of reputable institutions and individuals is maligned by overzealous advocacy ….. and ….by what passes for academic research when it is clearly constructed to fulfil an advocacy agenda”.

This denigration of public health research has been strongly criticised by independent experts. In her 2006 verdict in an extortion case against the tobacco industry in the United States Judge Gladys Kessler noted: “Much of the Defendants’ [i.e. the tobacco industry’s] criticisms of Government witnesses focused on the fact that these witnesses had been long-time, devoted members of “the public health community.” To suggest that they were presenting inaccurate, untruthful, or unreliable testimony because they had spent their professional lives trying to improve the public health of this country is patently absurd”.

The recent high court ruling on the challenges made by British American Tobacco, PMI, Japan Tobacco International and Imperial Tobacco to UK standardised packaging legislation made a similar point, citing Sir Cyril Chantler’s 2015 review of the evidence: “Chantler … rejected the criticism made by the tobacco companies that those that advised the Government were biased against the industry. Conversely, he articulated scepticism about the methodological efficacy of research results generated by the tobacco companies. He also criticised the tobacco companies for adopting unrealistic criticisms of the output of existing researchers…”

This ruling drew upon two peer-reviewed papers, one confirming the poor quality of industry evidence in comparison to public health evidence on standardised packaging and the other paper showing how BAT and JTI went about distorting and misrepresenting public health evidence.

ITIC’s second claim is that it is not a lobby group. Yet based on widely accepted definitions of lobbying, ITIC’s own descriptions of its activities, and the global health communities’ observations of its behaviour, ITIC clearly acts as a lobbying organisation.

Indeed, it has persistently boasted of its lobbying success. in 1995, ITIC produced a document which outlined how “ITIC has developed trusted, advisory relationships with key, senior-level policy makers…..[which]…provide channels for private sector expertise to reach the Government before, during and after the official policy-making process. This combination…… provides ITIC and its sponsors a ‘seat at the policy-making table’”. And in 2004, Daniel Witt, ITIC’s President noted: “ITIC is a public policy organization actively work ing to change public policy in a pro-investment direction.” Although ITIC claims to be an “independent, non-profit research and educational organization” it receives tobacco company funding and has industry representatives on its Board of Directors. Outputs such as the Asia-11 and Asia-14 illicit trade indicator studies, commissioned by PMI and published by ITIC along with global advisory firm Oxford Economics, have been critiqued by Dr Hana Ross (on behalf of SEATCA) for opaque methodology and “unverifiable” results that were “inconsistent with results from other studies” in the region (for more on this issue, read here). In 2014, ITIC was blasted by the WHO for its underhand attempt to destabilise the proposed guidelines on tobacco tax and price policy by convening a meeting with Parties and Observers to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) immediately prior to the sixth Conference of the Parties (COP6).

Finally, in each letter, ITIC’s President, Daniel Witt argues that public health organisations ought to engage with ITIC given its tax expertise. This position displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the FCTC’s Article 5.3 which aims to protect policy making from the vested interests of the tobacco industry. It also displays a fundamental lack of understanding of public attitudes to ITIC. For example, the World Bank withdrew from an ITIC event in India, following a letter from the Institute of Public Health in the country, similarly, following a letter from ASH (UK), the UK Department for International Development (DfiD) asked ITIC to remove its name, from its list of sponsors on ITIC’s website as DfiD has never been a sponsor, and the WHO has urged all governments not to engage with ITIC.

SEATCA and the University of Bath have respectively published and sent to ITIC detailed rebuttals of ITIC’s letters to them. These rebuttals and the aforementioned high court rulings are unlikely to deter ITIC from trying to influence tobacco control policies such as standardised packaging across the globe and undermining Article 5.3 of the FCTC. But the more people who reject engagement with ITIC, the harder it will be for ITIC to boast that it can get its tobacco industry clients a “seat at the policy making table”.

Boost for tobacco brands as poll confirms consumer fears over counterfeit impact of plain packaging

http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Blog/detail.aspx?g=82cde779-058b-483e-b19e-f76e579dc529

One of the arguments made against the introduction of plain packaging for cigarettes and other tobacco products is that the absence of branding would exacerbate the problem of counterfeiting, with potentially unsafe products becoming more accessible. As Malaysia lays the groundwork for a plain packaging regime, a recent poll of Malaysian consumers would seem to support that concern.

A nationwide survey carried out by the Merdeka Center for Opinion Research, on behalf of the Malaysia Singapore Coffee Shop Proprietors’ General Association (MSCSPGA), has found that 81% of Malaysians believe that plain packaging would make it easier for counterfeiters to produce fake tobacco products. Moreover, 65% of respondents are concerned that this would lead to an increase in criminal activity in the country; while 88% think that the introduction of plain packaging would boost sales of fake and smuggled cigarettes as smokers turn to the black and grey markets to buy cheaper packs. However, it is not clear if respondents believe this will happen as a reaction to the plain packaging itself and a desire for branded packs, or more simply because black and grey market alternatives sell for less.

To my knowledge, Malaysia is the only east Asian government that has so far announced plans to introduce plain packaging regulations for cigarettes and other tobacco products – though at this stage, the proposals remain far from concrete. “We are planning to do that in stages, but at this moment, we don’t have a firm date,” Chong Chee Keong, director of the disease control division of Malaysia’s Ministry of Health, told the Malay Mail back in February, adding that the government believes plain packaging measures would have the biggest impact on reducing smoking, particularly among younger and less frequent users. As expected, the announcement was met with support from health campaigners and opposition from the tobacco industry, which claims that such measures trample its trademark rights.

Smoking is prevalent in Malaysia, with the country’s Ministry of Health reporting approximately 4.7 million smokers out of a population of around 30 million as of April 2015. Smoking among males is particularly widespread, at 38%; older World Health Organisation data from 2008 puts this figure significantly higher, at 54.4% of the male population.

In any case, smoking remains a major public health issue in this rapidly developing country. With an estimated 20,000 deaths each year from directly smoking-related illness, it is clear why the government is keen to take action. Late last year, it increased excise tax on cigarettes by 40%, following a 12% hike in 2014, in addition to the recent introduction of a 6% goods and services tax. Tobacco companies raised prices as a result of these moves and argued that the government’s moves would further contribute to Malaysia’s already ingrained problems with counterfeit and grey market cigarettes.

According to the MSCSPGA, these account for about half of all of the cigarettes sold in the country at present. In Malaysia, where smoking is still legal in many public places and any bans that do exist are often not strictly enforced, cafes and restaurants – including those represented by the MSCSPGA – benefit from being able to sell tobacco products on their premises. Ho Su Mong, president of the MSCSPGA, told the Mail that fakes and smuggled cigarettes are costing retailers over 500 million ringgit (US$122 million) in lost income every year.

With this knowledge, it is clear why the MSCSPGA commissioned the survey and this economic interest will likely be pointed to by plain packaging proponents.

Nevertheless, the survey results will come as a much-needed fillip – albeit a small one – to trademark owners in the tobacco industry, and other sectors where plain packaging could potentially be implemented, at a time when they are most certainly on the back foot. Whether consumer concern causes the government to pause for thought remains to be seen.

‘World’s ugliest colour’ used on cigarette packets to put smokers off

The shade, described as a “drab dark brown”, was found through a process of seven studies involving 1000 smokers

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/worlds-ugliest-colour-revealed-pantone-448c-a7076446.html

New plain cigarette packaging in the UK, Ireland and France will bear a colour deemed the ugliest in the world by researchers in Australia.

Pantone 448 C, also known as ‘opaque couché’, is the shade chosen as most likely to put smokers off, a group of academics and market researchers decided after three months of research.

Marketing agency GfK Bluemoon, who headed the project, conducted seven studies with more than 1000 smokers to design the most unappealing packaging possible, according to the Sydney Morning Herald.

The ugly brown colour has been associated with dirt, tar, and even death, without any positive adjectives, say the researchers, who were commissioned back in 2012.

“It had as its aim the antithesis of what is our usual objective,’’ said market researcher Victoria Parr.

‘‘We didn’t want to create attractive, aspirational packaging designed to win customers […] Instead our role was to help our client reduce demand, with the ultimate aim to minimise use of the product,” she added.

Pantone 448 C, also known as 'opaque couché'

Pantone 448 C, also known as ‘opaque couché’

The new packets, in Pantone 448 C with off-putting photographs, were rolled out in the UK on 20 May.

France and Ireland have also adopted the decision to end attractively-branded cigarette packets, which was pioneered by Australia in 2012.

The PM, his pro-smoking aide, and a dirty war over cigarette packaging

The sale of the plain packets is set to become compulsory in the UK from May 2017.

One in five adults is said to smoke in the UK and according to the British Medical Association, smoking costs the NHS £2.7 billion each year.

Smoke and Mirrors? Structuring of Foreign Investments Following the Philip Morris Award

http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a2cfda47-0e67-4a86-91c4-2eba3fa71966

Perhaps the most high-profile case in the debate over investor-state arbitration in recent years has been the investment treaty claim by Philip Morris against the Australian Government, concerning the introduction of tobacco plain packaging rules. Opponents have relied on the case to highlight the perceived risk of “regulatory chill” caused by the proliferation of “secret courts”, while many proponents had hoped that the case would result in an award that carefully balanced the State’s “right to regulate” with the investor’s rights to “fair and equitable treatment” and “legitimate expectations”. The recently published decision[1] of the tribunal not to exercise jurisdiction over the claim has therefore resulted in a degree of disappointment from all quarters. Nonetheless, the award on jurisdiction and admissibility of 17 December 2015 deals with some important issues that have direct relevance to any investors seeking to restructure their investments in a manner that maximises their chances of obtaining investment treaty protections.

Background

The claim was brought by Philip Morris Asia Limited (“PM Asia“), a Hong Kong based subsidiary of Philip Morris International Inc. (“PMI“), under the Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, dated 15 September 1993 (the “Treaty“). The substantive claim arose from the introduction of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 and the Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011, which prohibited the use of brands, trademarks and logos on tobacco packaging. PM Asia argued that this amounted to an indirect expropriation of its intellectual property rights and transformed its Australian subsidiary (“PM Australia“) from a manufacturer of branded products to a manufacturer of commoditised products, thus substantially diminishing the value of its investments in Australia. PM Asia claimed damages of over US$ 4 billion.

The award sets out a detailed description of the chronology preceding the claim, but in summary, Australia had first considered plain packaging legislation in 1995. After various consultations and one abortive attempt to introduce legislation into the Senate, the Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, officially announced his intention to introduce plain packaging legislation in April 2010. Following Mr Rudd’s defenestration by Julia Gillard and the subsequent election in August 2010, the Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill was eventually introduced into parliament in April 2011 and received Royal Assent on 1 December 2011.

In parallel with these developments, PMI had expressed its opposition to plain packaging legislation in Australia from at least late 2009. It maintained its dialogue with the Government from that point onwards, describing the proposals as “restrictions tantamount to expropriation” and threatening “legal challenges” if the proposals were pursued. Staring in September 2010, PMI began restructuring several of its global affiliates, with the stated aim of streamlining its corporate structure. On 21 January 2011, PMI filed a foreign investment application regarding the proposed purchase of PM Australia by PM Asia. The Treasury subsequently issued a “non-objection letter” and the acquisition completed on 23 February 2011. PM Asia issued its initial notice of claim under the Treaty on 27 June 2011 and its formal notice of arbitration on 21 November 2011, the day that the Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill passed both Houses of Parliament.

Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility

The award on jurisdiction and admissibility deals with two preliminary objections by Australia:

  • the “Non-Admission Objection” – Australia argued that PM Asia’s investment in PM Australia was not properly admitted in accordance with Australian law and therefore fell outside the subject-matter jurisdiction (ratione materiae) of the tribunal;
  • the “Temporal Objection” – Australia argued that there was a pre-existing dispute between PMI and the Australian Government concerning the plain packaging proposals, and PM Asia’s investment in PM Australia post-dated this dispute, so it did not fall within the temporal jurisdiction (ratione temporis) of the tribunal. Australia supplemented this jurisdictional objection with an admissibility objection: even if the tribunal had jurisdiction over the claim, it should not exercise its jurisdiction because PM Asia’s claim under the Treaty amounted to an abuse of process.
  • The “Non-Admission Objection” is specific to the facts of the case and is therefore of limited significance. However, the tribunal’s findings on the “Temporal Objection” may have wider application and are therefore worth further consideration.

PM Asia’s primary response to the Temporal Objection was that it had controlled PM Australia prior to the restructuring, through the exercise of management functions and strategic/budgetary decisions since 2001. The Treaty definition of an “investment” included assets “owned or controlled” by an investor and so PM Asia argued that it was eligible for the protections afforded by the Treaty long before its formal acquisition of PM Australia. The tribunal undertook a brief analysis of the case law on the distinction between ownership and control and found that PM Asia’s involvement in the approval of expenditures and dividends, its role in branding and marketing strategy and its supervision of PM Australia’s staff were insufficient to amount to “control” in circumstances where PM Asia’s actions were undertaken in accordance with PMI global policies and procedures and were ultimately subject to PMI approvals.

Having determined that PM Asia’s only eligible investment was its acquisition of PM Australia in February 2011, the tribunal therefore needed to ascertain whether it had jurisdiction and, if so, whether there was any reason for it to refuse to exercise that jurisdiction. Applying Gremcitel,[2] the tribunal held that whenever a cause of action is based on a treaty breach, the test for ratione temporis is whether the claimant made the protected investment before the moment when the alleged breach occurred. In that case, the tribunal had found that the critical date on which the breach crystallised was when the relevant legislative measures were adopted, notwithstanding the fact that this may have been “the culmination of a process or sequence of events which may have started years earlier“. In PM Asia’s case, it was the enactment of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act in December 2011 that allegedly breached the Treaty and so PM Asia’s investment in February 2011 pre-dated the breach. Accordingly, the tribunal found that it did have jurisdiction over PM Asia’s claim.

Moving on to the question of admissibility, the tribunal undertook an analysis of the arbitral case law on abuse of process. Drawing on several prominent cases,[3] the tribunal emphasised that the mere fact of restructuring an investment to obtain the protection of an investment treaty is not per se illegitimate and that the threshold for finding an “abusive manipulation of the system of international investment protection” is high.[4] Applying Tidewater andMobil,[5] the tribunal determined that the key question was whether there was a “pre-existing” dispute at the time the restructuring was carried out. The tribunal grappled with the various formulations adopted in Gremcitel, Lao Holdingsand Pac Rim[6] and held that the initiation of a treaty claim constitutes an abuse of process when an investor “has changed its corporate structure to gain the protection of an investment treaty at a point when a specific dispute was foreseeable“.[7] Rather than adopting the test of foreseeability articulated in Pac Rim as “a very high probability and not merely a possibility“, the tribunal held instead that a dispute is foreseeable when there is a “reasonable prospect… that a measure which may give rise to a treaty claim will materialise“.[8]

Applying this test to the facts, the tribunal noted PMI’s objection to the Government’s proposals as early as 2009, including specific references to the deprivation of property rights and possible legal challenges. The tribunal also emphasised the fact that, while it took a considerable time for the legislation to pass and there was a degree of uncertainty as to whether the Government could obtain the parliamentary majority needed to pass the legislation, the intention of the Government remained relatively clear since April 2010 and so there was at least a “reasonable prospect” of the legislation being passed from that point onwards.

Notwithstanding these findings, the tribunal acknowledged that the commencement of a claim shortly after a corporate restructuring might not necessarily amount to an abuse of process where the restructuring was justified “independently of the possibility of bringing a claim“.[9] On the facts, the tribunal was unconvinced by PM Asia’s insistence that the restructuring (i) was part of a broader group-wide process, (ii) was needed to align ownership with pre-existing management control, (iii) helped minimise PM Asia’s tax liabilities, and (iv) helped to optimise cash flow. In particular, the tribunal noted the failure of PM Asia to present any witnesses who were directly familiar with the rationale for the restructuring and the lack of “contemporaneous corporate memoranda or other internal correspondence sufficiently explaining the business case for the restructuring in detail“.[10]

The tribunal also placed significant emphasis on the volume and timing of legal advice from PMI’s advisors concerning potential investment treaty claims. As part of the production phase of the arbitration, the parties agreed to exchange privilege logs listing any documents that they wished to withhold on grounds of privilege or political sensitivity. Following objections from both parties, the tribunal ordered the production of many of those documents.[11] While the award itself contains heavy redactions in relation to privileged and commercially sensitive documents, it is evident that the subject headings of emails passing between PMI and its legal advisors (for example, “Australia-HK BIT“, “Arbitration under the HK BIT“) gave a clear indication that PMI was being advised on potential investment treaty claims from as early as July 2010. Critical email exchanges also coincided precisely with the internal approval of the restructuring and the finalisation of the notice of claim.

In such circumstances, the tribunal was satisfied that the passage of the offending legislation was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen. The tribunal concluded that “the main and determinative, if not sole, reason for the restructuring was the intention to bring a claim under the Treaty, using an entity from Hong Kong“.[12] Since this was carried out “at a time when there was a reasonable prospect that the dispute would materialise” it was deemed to be an abuse of process. Accordingly, the tribunal declared the claim inadmissible, precluding it from exercising jurisdiction over the dispute.

Key Lessons

There are several key lessons to take away from the Philip Morris award for any investor seeking to restructure its foreign investments in an effort to maximise treaty protections:

  • Preparing for the “worst case scenario” by seeking legal advice on investment treaty protections is entirely normal and prudent business behaviour.
  • Similarly, restructuring investments to benefit from treaty protections is unlikely to be abusive where this is in response to a general risk of future disputes.
  • The threshold for abusive conduct lies where a restructuring takes place at a point in time when a specific dispute is foreseeable; in other words, there is a reasonable prospect that a measure giving rise to a treaty claim will materialise.
  • Factual evidence is likely to be fundamental to the outcome of any objection based on abuse of process. It is therefore critical to ensure that any other reasons for the restructuring (such as tax benefits, costs reductions, management rationalisation) are well-documented and are presented in a manner that can be adduced in evidence without jeopardising any subsequent claims for legal privilege.
  • Legal advice on potential investment treaty protections should be sought as early as possible, and certainly prior to the crystallisation of a specific dispute. Wherever possible, any communications seeking legal advice should be clearly marked as privileged and should be drafted carefully to avoid any inadvertent suggestions that a specific dispute is either inevitable or foreseeable.