Clear The Air News Tobacco Blog Rotating Header Image

WHO

Hasten passing of tobacco laws tobacco control

MALAYSIA became party to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2003. FCTC Article 15 enumerates in detail measures to tackle illicit trade in tobacco products.

http://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/letters/2017/09/25/hasten-passing-of-tobacco-laws-tobacco-control/

Although the relevant authorities have been discussing the illicit trade in tobacco products, including preparation for the ratification of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (ITP) by Malaysia, there seems to be lack of or even absence of serious and effective measures to stop the reportedly growing illicit trade in tobacco products so far.

Article 15.7 of the FCTC calls for licensing to control or regulate the production and distribution of tobacco products in order to prevent illicit trade.

The National Kenaf and Tobacco Board Act 2009 amendment in 2010 stipulates licensing of tobacco and tobacco products.

Licensing of Tobacco and Tobacco Products Regulation 2011 has yet to be implemented amid continued opposition by the tobacco industry.

We must be reminded that the provision on the ban of kiddie packs under The Control of Tobacco Product Regulations 2004 was also delayed for over six years due to interference by the tobacco industry.

Again, this is in contravention to Article 5 General obligations of the WHO FCTC, which states in 5.3: “In setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”

With such blatant disregard to legal provisions and international treaty obligations, the tobacco industry’s typical threats of loss of employment, loss to tobacco farmers, increasing illicit cigarettes and now the increased use of illicit cigarettes by young smokers become the emotive justification by the industry and the front groups in chorus to blind and blinker all the public healthcare professionals’ expert recommendations.

Cigarette retailers and the cigarette companies are not a stakeholder in deciding public health policies. They have vested interest in the sale and promotion of tobacco products.

WHO reports link direct and indirect involvement of the tobacco industry in the smuggling and illicit trade of tobacco products. As such, they have no credibility and their proposal aims only to guarantee benefits to them.

Instead of entertaining regressive ideas and proposals, all related parties should be tightening the tobacco products supply chain under the Blue Ocean Strategy.

For a start, immediately institute a ban on sale of tobacco products at places other than permanent premises.

This measure was successfully used to tackle pirated CD/DVD sale by local governments before.

Hasten the implementation of licensing of tobacco and tobacco products by National Kenaf and Tobacco Board.

MUHAMMAD SHA’ANI ABDULLAH

Co-ordinator,
Tobacco Control @ Smoke Free Malaysia Initiative
Federation of Malaysia Consumers Association

Tobacco control threatens to implode over new initiative

The tobacco control industry spectacularly turned on itself this week, with the launch of a new foundation dedicated to end tobacco smoking. Far from being welcomed across the industry, the move has led to open hostility between harm reduction advocates and prohibitionists.

https://www.vapingpost.com/2017/09/22/tobacco-control-threatens-to-implode-over-new-initiative/

The Foundation for a Smoke-Free World, an independent non-profit organisation, is headed by former World Health Organisation tobacco control chief Derek Yach and supported by leading harm reduction advocates like Professor Marewa Glover. Initial funding totalling $80 million per year for the next twelve years has come from PMI, which seems to be what’s sent public health zealots into a flat spin. Although the foundation’s by-laws make clear that it’s free to spend the money without interference or oversight by donors, the idea of industry funding for a harm reduction organisation has triggered prohibitionists on a huge scale.

A hysterical outburst by UCSF’s Stanton Glantz, entitled Derek Yach’s journey to the Dark Side is now complete, accused the foundation of being a “PR effort” and “industry front group”. An equally over-excited blog post on the British Medical Journal’s website repeated the “front group” smear, and accused Yach of “dismissing 40 years of tobacco control activism”.

The BMJ post’s authors include Anna Gilmore (a British professor who has been implicated in using her seat on a funding committee to allocate taxpayer funds to herself), Ruth Malone from UCSF’s School of Nursing and Australian pensioner Simon Chapman. Among their many complaints is that the tobacco control industry is “already vibrant” and has “fresh ideas”. However the foundation’s launch video, produced by A Billion Lives director Aaron Biebert, points out that current strategies based on restrictions and punishing smokers have run out of steam – and the tobacco control establishment has run out of ideas.

WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Secretariat’s statement on the launch of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World

The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Secretariat (Convention Secretariat) notes the launch of the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World, led by a former official of the World Health Organization.

http://www.who.int/fctc/mediacentre/statement/secretariat-statement-launch-foundation-for-a-smoke-free-world/en/

The Convention Secretariat regards this tobacco industry-funded initiative as a clear attempt to breach the WHO FCTC by interfering in public policy. It is a deeply alarming development aimed at damaging the treaty’s implementation, particularly through the Foundation’s contentious research programmes.

The WHO FCTC is the world’s only tobacco control evidence based treaty and has been commended by global leaders as providing the primary roadmap to a tobacco-free world. It has 181 Parties, representing 180 States and the European Union, and is supported by numerous nongovernmental organizations.

The Convention Secretariat wishes to make the following points and clarifications:

1. With regard to the president of this Foundation

Although the president of the Foundation was part of the WHO Secretariat during the negotiation of the WHO FCTC, the treaty had no single architect. It resulted from the work of hundreds of committed government representatives, individuals and organizations, and that is its greatest strength – teamwork.

The Foundation’s president is in no way linked to the Convention Secretariat, nor does he represent the Convention Secretariat’s views.

2. With regard to the Foundation’s funding

The Foundation for a Smoke-Free World describes itself as an independent organization. It reportedly will be funded solely with almost US$ 1 billion from Philip Morris International, the tobacco conglomerate.

There is extensive experience of tobacco-industry funded research that was later used to prevent effective tobacco control policies. It is clear that the industry aims to follow the same path in the area of non-traditional tobacco products, which are unregulated in many countries.

3. With regard to interactions with the tobacco industry

Parties to the WHO FCTC should note that any collaboration with this Foundation, due to its current funding arrangement that comes from a tobacco multinational, would constitute a clear breach of Article 5.3 of the Convention concerning tobacco industry interference.

Parties to the Convention have agreed, through the Guidelines to Article 5.3, that activities described as “socially responsible” by the tobacco industry, constitute a marketing and public-relations strategy that falls within the Convention’s definition of advertising, promotion and sponsorship. Parties should not endorse, support, form partnerships with or participate in tobacco industry activities described as socially responsible. Tobacco industry is clearly looking for a seat at the table.

4. With regard to new products

The tobacco industry is introducing new products in pursuit of profit rather than public health. For example, new “heat-no-burn” products contain tobacco and electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) contain nicotine, an addictive substance regulated through appropriate policies under Article 5.2(b) of the Convention related to legislative and administrative measures.

Parties to the Convention have agreed to consider applying regulatory measures to prohibit or restrict the manufacture, importation, distribution, presentation, sale and use of ENDS, as appropriate to their national laws and public health objectives. If other novel tobacco or nicotine products emerge, the way that they are treated needs to be considered in the same way.

5. With regard to possible effects on tobacco growers

Article 17 of the WHO FCTC requires Parties to promote, as appropriate, economically viable alternatives for tobacco workers and growers. The tobacco industry knows that it creates social problems, including the use of child labour. Initiatives endorsed by the industry and those it funds are not designed to solve the problems it creates, but to give a false impression of sympathy for its victims.

6. With regard to the impact of the WHO FCTC on public health

The WHO FCTC, despite the efforts of the tobacco industry to prevent progress, has substantially improved global public health through the evidence-based measures it endorses.

The WHO FCTC has been recognized as playing “a critical role as an authoritative and agreed catalyst and framework for action.” The use by the tobacco industry of research to prevent effective tobacco control policies, now in relation to non-traditional tobacco products, is proof that the policies originating from Parties’ implementation of the WHO FCTC provisions are having an important and lasting effect on tobacco control.

Wait, What? Tobacco Giant Backs Foundation to End Smoking

An old adage in journalism states that when a dog bites a man, it’s not news. But when a man bites a dog, now, that’s news. Well, the proverbial man just bit the dog in the form of a nearly $1 billion pledge to reduce smoking from the maker of Marlboro cigarettes.

https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2017/9/18/turning-over-a-new-leaf-tobacco-giant-backs-foundation-to-end-smoking-1

Philip Morris International will donate $80 million a year for the next 12 years to the recently launched Foundation for a Smoke-Free World. The new foundation stresses independence from its donors and their agendas, but so far, the company behind Marlboro is its only backer.

The donation comes as Philip Morris is said to be preparing for a smoke-free future. More than 3 million smokers have switched to the company’s e-cigarette IQOS, according to Bloomberg. IQOS heats tobacco to produce a vapor instead of burning it, which the company believes makes it less harmful than conventional cigarettes. The company asked the FDA to approve marketing that sells the product as a device that may reduce the chance of smoking-related diseases.

Derek Yach, the man heading the new foundation, is a vocal supporter of e-cigarettes. The devices, which don’t contain tar, provide a safer alternative for smokers to use while weaning themselves off traditional cigarettes, Yach wrote in a 2015 editorial. Opponents argue that “safer” is not the same as “safe,” and claim that e-cigarettes act as a gateway drug for conventional cigarettes.

Yach is a former World Health Organization official who led the organization’s campaigns against health issues arising from unhealthy diets and smoking. He worked on a global tobacco treaty while at the organization, but has a history of making deals with the devil in the name of progress. Yach worked for PepsiCo for six years after leaving WHO, where he says he pushed the company to make products healthier, including chips with less salt and fat and drinks with less sugar. It’s hard to miss the parallels to Yach’s latest endeavor and its backer.

The Philip Morris donation to the Foundation for a Smoke-Free World was met with skepticism from some.

Deborah Arnott, the CEO of Action on Smoking and Health, a public health charity based in the U.K., criticized the announcement. “Tobacco industry claims can never be accepted at face value,” she said. “The tobacco industry has a terrible track record of funding research designed to support its efforts to block policies to cut smoking.”

Arnott has a point. The tobacco industry has a long and checkered past in meddling in medical and research fields to benefit its bottom line. From the 1920s through the 1940s, the industry leaned heavily on advertising that claimed cigarettes were “physician approved.”

More recently, the industry funded research designed to support the claim that secondhand smoke posed no danger to non-smokers, a review of millions of pages of industry documents revealed. Research proving the opposite was used to support smoking bans in public and private places.

Some worry that the new foundation bankrolled by Philip Morris will also produce research and disseminate information that misleads the public. The International Union against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease denounced the gift as “a billion-dollar bribe the tobacco company hopes will secure it a seat at the table with public health policymakers around the world… Through propaganda, it only has the potential to undermine, delay and obfuscate the work of public health policymakers and advocates who champion evidence-based measures to reduce tobacco use.” The Union said that the company will continue to spend exponentially more money to hook people in poor countries on smoking than on preventive efforts through the foundation.

Although smoking is on the decline in the U.S., tobacco use is still the leading preventable cause of death in the country, according the Center for Disease Control.

Worldwide, tobacco kills about 6 million people a year, which is more than AIDS and malaria combined. The number is projected to rise to 8 million by 2030.

Despite that, there’s not a widespread effort among funders to curb smoking, which is another reason the Philip Morris gift is notable. The two biggest names in the space right now are Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Gates Foundation. Back in 2015, the two teamed up to take on companies like Philip Morris that sue low- and middle-income countries to prevent their governments from enforcing strong tobacco control laws.

The tobacco giant’s intentions and the young foundation’s integrity remain to be seen.

The Union denounces PMI launch of a ‘Foundation for a Smoke-free World’

Download (PDF, 23KB)

WHO report gives India high marks for fighting tobacco use

A new report by the World Health Organisation on the global use of tobacco shows India, Bangladesh and Bhutan on top of the list of South East Asian countries that have achieved a high level of tobacco control.

http://www.domain-b.com/organisation/who_collaborating_centre/20170721_tobacco.html

The prevalence of tobacco use in India has fallen from 34.1 per cent to 28.6 per cent over the last seven years, the report says, comparing data from two rounds of the Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) in 2009-10 and 2016-17.

The WHO report titled Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2017: Monitoring Tobacco Use and Prevention Policies, was released in New York on Wednesday on the sidelines of the United Nations High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. The report covers 194 countries, divided into The Americas, South East Asia, Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and Africa. There are 11 countries in the South East Asia group, including India.

Though the population worldwide protected by tobacco control measures has grown almost five-fold than ten years ago, the World Health Organisation (WHO) on Wednesday called on countries to do more to prioritise these life-saving policies.

In India, Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi, Hyderabad, Bengaluru, Pune, Surat, Kanpur, Jaipur, Lucknow and Nagpur are among the top 100 cities across the world named for the strict implementation of policies to prevent tobacco use. The report lists the cities population-wise, using figures published in the UN Statistics Division’s Demographic Yearbook.

Globally, the WHO report said about 4.7 billion people, or 63 per cent of the world’s population, are covered today by at least one comprehensive tobacco control measure. Ten years ago, in 2007, the number was only one billion, or 15 per cent of the world’s population.

However, tobacco use has still become the leading single preventable cause of death worldwide, killing over seven million people each year.

Its economic costs are also enormous, totalling more than $1.4 trillion in healthcare and lost productivity, according to WHO.

Meanwhile, the tobacco industry continues to hamper government efforts to fully implement life- and cost-saving interventions, by, for example, exaggerating the economic importance of the tobacco industry, discrediting proven science, and using litigation to intimidate governments, the report says.

Poor countries ahead
More than half of the top national performers on tobacco control are low- and middle-income countries, showing that progress is possible regardless of economic situation. A tracking of MPOWER measures – introduced by WHO in 2007 to assist in the country-level implementation of measures to reduce the demand for tobacco – has revealed that the number of people protected by at least one best-practice measure has quadrupled to 4.7 billion – or almost two-thirds of the world’s population.

As many as 121 out of 194 countries have introduced at least one MPOWER measure at the highest level of achievement (not including monitoring or mass media campaigns, which are assessed separately).

Thirty-four countries with a total population of 2 billion have adopted large graphic pack warnings. Six countries (Afghanistan, Cambodia, El Salvador, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Romania and Uganda) have adopted new laws making all indoor public places and workplaces smoke-free. Six countries (El Salvador, Estonia, India, Jamaica, Luxembourg and Senegal) have advanced to best-practice level with their tobacco use cessation services, the report says.

India and Nepal are regional and global leaders in implementing large, pictorial warning labels on tobacco packaging. With the increase in the size of pack warnings to 85 per cent of both front and back panels on all tobacco products, India now has the third largest pack warning label among all countries.

The findings of GATS-2 showed that graphic warning labels depicting throat cancer and oral cancer are a strong tool to discourage the youth from initiating tobacco, and have motivated 275 million current users to quit.

Dr Vinayak Prasad, Geneva-based head of the WHO Tobacco Free Initiative, told The Indian Express that among the many measures to control tobacco in India was the joint WHO-International Telecommunication Union initiative mCessation, launched in 2015 with the Ministries of Health and Family Welfare and Communication and Information Technology. ”The programme to encourage people to quit tobacco use registered more than two million users last year and the initial evaluation showed that more than 7% quit successfully after six months,” Dr Prasad said.

The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), the first international treaty negotiated under the auspices of WHO, was adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2003, and entered into force in 2005. It has since become one of the most widely embraced treaties in UN history.

Tobacco companies interfere with health regulations, WHO reports

Tobacco industry is interfering with government attempts to regulate products and aggressively pursuing new markets in Africa, World Health Organization says

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/19/tobacco-industry-government-policy-interference-regulations

Cigarette manufacturers are attempting to thwart government tobacco controls wherever possible, even as governments make progress regulating the products, a new World Health Organization report has found.

World health officials also warn that tobacco companies have moved their fight to the developing world, such as Africa, where smoking rates are predicted to rise by double digits in the coming decades.

“Tobacco industry interference in government policymaking represents a deadly barrier to advancing health and development in many countries,” said Douglas Bettcher, director of the WHO’s department for the prevention of noncommunicable diseases. “But by monitoring and blocking such activities, we can save lives and sow the seeds for a sustainable future for all.”

Tobacco-related diseases are the leading preventable cause of death worldwide. The products kill more than 7 million people each year – more than HIV and Aids, tuberculosis and malaria combined. The effects of the substance are also costly. Researchers believe that tobacco-related harm costs the world $1.4tn in healthcare costs and lost productivity.

A recent investigation by the Guardian found that tobacco companies, including British American Tobacco, threatened African countries with domestic and trade lawsuits if certain anti-smoking measures were put in place. BAT says it is not against all regulations but needs to take action from “time to time”.

A Reuters investigation found that BAT’s arch-rival, Philip Morris International, developed a vast lobbying campaign to delay and prevent tobacco controls. PMI says there is nothing improper about its executives engaging with government officials.

Wednesday’s WHO report, which was funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies, comes on the same day as a shareholder vote on a $49bn merger between BAT and Reynolds American Incorporated, a deal that would make BAT the largest listed tobacco company in the world.

“The epicentre of this epidemic has moved to the developing world,” said Dr Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva, head of WHO’s convention secretariat. “Low- and middle-income countries struggle to combat a tobacco industry seeking to pursue new markets, often through shameless interference with public health policymaking.”

Currently, the World Health Organization recommends countries put in place six regulations health officials see as critical to reducing smoking: systems to monitor smoking rates; laws to protect people from secondhand smoke; tools to help people quit; warnings about the dangers of tobacco use; enforcement of advertising bans, and increased taxes on tobacco products.

Six in 10 countries have implemented at least one of the six protections, officials said, four times the population that was protected in 2007.

However, progress is lopsided. Some recommendations have been far more widely accepted than others. For example, 3.5 billion people in 78 countries are protected by graphic warnings on cigarette packs, but only 15% of the world’s population is protected by a comprehensive advertising ban, and high tobacco taxes, while very effective, are one of the least-implemented measures.

Even some wealthier nations have had trouble getting tobacco control measures in effect. In the United States, for example, there are no graphic warnings on cigarette packs because of industry lawsuits and regulatory delay, and tobacco taxes remain low.

Anti-tobacco lawmakers and campaigners in the US blame the slow progress on “pervasive” tobacco industry influence, which reaches all the way to top officials in the Trump White House.

“Working together, countries can prevent millions of people from dying each year from preventable tobacco-related illness,” said Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the WHO director-general. “Governments around the world must waste no time”.

Bloomberg Philanthropies funds Vital Strategies, which part funds the Guardian’s Tobacco: a deadly business series, the content of which is editorially independent.

UN Reports More People Warned Against Tobacco Use

Despite measures protecting a majority of people from tobacco-related illness and death, the tobacco industry continues to hamper Government efforts to fully implement life and cost-saving interventions, the United Nations health agency reported.

http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/features/health/1707/4690-1.htm

“One-third of countries have comprehensive systems to monitor tobacco use. While this is up from one-quarter of countries monitoring tobacco use at recommended levels in 2007, Governments still need to do more to prioritize or finance this area of work,” according to the UN World Health Organization’s WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic, which was launched today on side-lines of the UN High-level political forum on sustainable development in New York.

The report shows that some 4.7 billion people – more than 60 per cent of the population – are protected by at least one “best practice” tobacco control measure from the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC). These measures include no smoking areas and bans on advertising tobacco products, for example.

In the foreword to the report, the head of WHO urged Governments to incorporate all the provisions of the WHO FCTC into their national tobacco control programmes and policies, and to fight against the illicit tobacco trade.

“Working together, countries can prevent millions of people from dying each year from preventable tobacco-related illness, and save billions of dollars a year in avoidable health-care expenditures and productivity losses,” said Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General.

The report, funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies, noted that systematic monitoring of tobacco industry interference in government policymaking protects public health by shedding light on tobacco industry tactics.

Such tactics include “exaggerating the economic importance of the tobacco industry, discrediting proven science and using litigation to intimidate governments.”

Douglas Bettcher, director of WHO’s Department for the Prevention of Noncommunicable Diseases (NCDs), said tobacco industry interference in government policy making represents “a deadly barrier to advancing health and development in many countries.

Controlling tobacco use is a key part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Agenda includes targets to strengthen national implementation of the WHO FCTC and a one-third reduction in premature deaths from NCDs, including heart and lung diseases, cancer and diabetes, according to a press release launching the report.

“The progress that’s been made worldwide – and documented throughout this report – shows that it is possible for countries to turn the tide,” said Michael R. Bloomberg, WHO Global Ambassador for Noncommunicable Diseases and founder of Bloomberg Philanthropies.

Taxation: Most effective but still the least-used tobacco control measure

source: Infographic: Stop Smoking: It's Deadly and Bad for the Economy

source: Infographic: Stop Smoking: It’s Deadly and Bad for the Economy

A new report by the World Health Organization (WHO) shares some good news: Six in 10 people worldwide are now protected by at least one of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)-recommended demand reduction measures, including taxation. The report, launched on the sidelines of the UN high-level political forum on sustainable development, also makes clear that raising taxes to increase tobacco product prices is the most cost-effective means to reduce tobacco use and prevent initiation among the youth. But it is still one of the least used tobacco control measures.

https://blogs.worldbank.org/health/taxation-most-effective-still-least-used-tobacco-control-measure

The facts about this global public health scourge are undisputable:

  • Tobacco use is the leading single preventable cause of death worldwide, killing over 7 million people each year.
  • Cigarettes are addictive by design, and smoking cigarettes can damage every part of the body, causing different cancers from the head or neck to the lungs and cervix and other chronic conditions such as stroke and heart disease, which lead to early death.
  • The direct and indirect economic costs are also enormous, totaling more than US$1.4 trillion.
  • Controlling tobacco use is critical for the achievement of the health and social and economic targets in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

But we know what needs to be done and governments are acting. Governments are implementing “MPOWER”, six tobacco control measures in line with the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). MPOWER includes:

  • Monitoring tobacco use and prevention policies;
  • Protecting people from tobacco smoke;
  • Offering help to quit tobacco use;
  • Warning about the dangers of tobacco;
  • Enforcing bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and
  • Raising tobacco taxes.

The WHO report indicates that 43% of the world’s population (3.2 billion people) are now covered by two or more MPOWER measures at the highest level, nearly seven times the number covered in 2007. Eight countries, including five low- and middle-income ones, have implemented four or more MPOWER measures at the highest level: Brazil, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Madagascar, Malta, Panama, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Some additional findings are noteworthy:

  • Monitoring: Several countries, such as Nepal, India, and the Philippines, that conducted WHO-backed initiatives to monitor tobacco use have used the information to adopt measures to protect people from tobacco use. For example, Philippines’ landmark Sin Tax Reform Law was passed in 2012 after its 2009 global adult tobacco survey showed high smoking rates among men (47.4%) and boys (12.9%). The implementation of this policy measure has contributed to declining tobacco use as evidenced by the country’s 2015 adult tobacco survey results.
  • Protect: Comprehensive smoke-free legislation is currently in place for almost 1.5 billion people in 55 countries. Dramatic progress has been witnessed in low- and middle-income countries, 35 of which have adopted these laws since 2007.
  • Offer: Appropriate cessation treatment is in place for 2.4 billion people in 26 countries.
  • Warn: More people are protected by strong graphic pack warnings than by any other MPOWER measure, covering almost 3.5 billion people in 78 countries – almost half (47%) the global population. And, 3.2 billion people live in a country that aired at least one comprehensive national anti-tobacco mass media campaign in the last two years.
  • Enforce: Bans on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship interfere with the tobacco industry’s ability to promote and sell its deadly products and reduce tobacco use. But only 15% of the world’s population is currently covered by a comprehensive ban.
  • Raise: Raising taxes to increase tobacco product prices is the most cost-effective measure to reduce tobacco use and encourage users to quit, but it is one of the least used tobacco control measures globally.

What the World Bank Group is doing

As an institution, the Bank has long been committed to tobacco control as reflected in its unambiguous Operational Directive 4.76 of 1999 that mandates that the World Bank Group does not lend directly or provide credits, grants, or guarantees for tobacco production, processing, or marketing. The Bank’s policy advice and technical assistance support tobacco tax increases to protect the population from health risks and to mobilize additional domestic resources.

Over the past two decades, Bank teams have carried out substantial analytical work to build the global knowledge base on issues related to tobacco control.

In recent years, the Bank, in partnership with the Gates and Bloomberg Foundations, and in coordination with WHO, has supported countries in the design of tobacco tax policy reforms to raise prices, reduce consumption, and mobilize domestic resources in accordance with the 2015 Financing for Development Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

In addition to support provided to the reforms in Philippines in 2012, in Botswana in 2013, in Ghana in 2014, and in Peru in 2015, the Bank’s assistance to Armenia, Colombia, Moldova, and Ukraine contributed to the adoption of significant tobacco tax increases in 2016. The total population covered by these policy actions is about 250 million people.

Ongoing support is being provided in 2017 to an additional set of countries across regions, including Montenegro, where the government recently announced that tobacco taxes will be increased over the next 3 years in line with the European Union Tobacco Tax Directive’s target rates, and in Lesotho, as part of the 2017 budget presented by the new government to Parliament.

In moving the global tobacco control agenda forward, as the findings of the 2017 WHO report suggest, a dedicated focus by governments with support of the international community is required to raise tobacco taxes since it continues to be the least used tobacco control measure. This is of critical importance to make these deadly products unaffordable, reduce consumption among current smokers, and prevent smoking initiation among children and youth.

While health is the main objective, we also need to argue, on the basis of country evidence from across the world, that raising tobacco taxes can generate a significant fiscal benefit by helping to expand a country’s tax base and increase the budgetary capacity of governments to fund priority investments and programs that benefit the entire population.

Inside Philip Morris’ campaign to subvert the global anti-smoking treaty

The world’s largest publicly traded tobacco company is deploying its vast resources against international efforts to reduce smoking. Internal documents uncovered by Reuters reveal details of the secret operation.

http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/pmi-who-fctc/

A group of cigarette company executives stood in the lobby of a drab convention center near New Delhi last November. They were waiting for credentials to enter the World Health Organization’s global tobacco treaty conference, one designed to curb smoking and combat the influence of the cigarette industry.

Treaty officials didn’t want them there. But still, among those lined up hoping to get in were executives from Japan Tobacco International and British American Tobacco Plc.

There was a big name missing from the group: Philip Morris International Inc. A Philip Morris representative later told Reuters its employees didn’t turn up because the company knew it wasn’t welcome.

In fact, executives from the largest publicly traded tobacco firm had flown in from around the world to New Delhi for the anti-tobacco meeting. Unknown to treaty organizers, they were staying at a hotel an hour from the convention center, working from an operations room there. Philip Morris International would soon be holding secret meetings with delegates from the government of Vietnam and other treaty members.

The object of these clandestine activities: the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, or FCTC, a treaty aimed at reducing smoking globally. Reuters has found that Philip Morris International is running a secretive campaign to block or weaken treaty provisions that save millions of lives by curbing tobacco use.

In an internal document, the company says it supported the enactment of the treaty. But Philip Morris has come to view it as a “regulatory runaway train” driven by “anti-tobacco extremists” – a description contained in the document, a 2014 PowerPoint presentation.

Confidential company documents and interviews with current and former Philip Morris employees reveal an offensive that stretches from the Americas to Africa to Asia, from hardscrabble tobacco fields to the halls of political power, in what may be one of the broadest corporate lobbying efforts in existence.

Details of those plans are laid bare in a cache of Philip Morris documents reviewed by Reuters, one of the largest tobacco industry leaks ever. Reuters is publishing a selection of those papers in a searchable repository, The Philip Morris Files.

Dating from 2009 to 2016, the thousands of pages include emails between executives, PowerPoint presentations, planning papers, policy toolkits, national lobbying plans and market analyses. Taken as a whole, they present a company that has focused its vast global resources on bringing to heel the world’s tobacco control treaty.

Philip Morris works to subvert the treaty on multiple levels. It targets the FCTC conferences where delegates gather to decide on anti-smoking guidelines. It also lobbies at the country level, where the makeup of FCTC delegations is determined and treaty decisions are turned into legislation.

Excerpts from the Philip Morris Files

Reuters uncovered thousands of pages of internal Philip Morris International documents. These excerpts show the company’s tactics for combating the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, or FCTC, a treaty aimed at reducing smoking worldwide. (Some documents include highlighting by Reuters; some names have been redacted.)

01

A slide from a 2014 Philip Morris corporate affairs presentation about the FCTC, the global anti-smoking treaty. CoP5 and CoP6 refer to the biennial meetings of treaty nations in 2012 and 2014. “ENDS” refers to e-cigarettes.

Another slide from the 2014 PowerPoint presentation. “Paradigm shift” refers to an expected boom in what the company calls “reduced-risk products.”

Another slide from the 2014 PowerPoint presentation. “Paradigm shift” refers to an expected boom in what the company calls “reduced-risk products.”

A slide from the 2014 presentation shows Philip Morris plans for tracking anti-smoking groups, which the company calls anti-tobacco organizations, or ATOs.

A slide from the 2014 presentation shows Philip Morris plans for tracking anti-smoking groups, which the company calls anti-tobacco organizations, or ATOs.

The same 2014 document shows objectives for corporate affairs executives. “Roadblocks” refers to delays in implementing anti-smoking steps. “MoH” refers to ministries of health.

The same 2014 document shows objectives for corporate affairs executives. “Roadblocks” refers to delays in implementing anti-smoking steps. “MoH” refers to ministries of health.

Another slide from the 2014 document shows the characteristics that a Philip Morris corporate affairs (“CA”) person should possess.

Another slide from the 2014 document shows the characteristics that a Philip Morris corporate affairs (“CA”) person should possess.

A more detailed account of Philip Morris’ corporate affairs tactics from the same 2014 presentation.

A more detailed account of Philip Morris’ corporate affairs tactics from the same 2014 presentation.

A list of methods the company has devised for opposing the implementation of plain packaging, a measure advocated by the FCTC that bars the use of logos and distinctive coloring on cigarette packs.

A list of methods the company has devised for opposing the implementation of plain packaging, a measure advocated by the FCTC that bars the use of logos and distinctive coloring on cigarette packs.

This slide from the 2014 presentation shows some of the resources Philip Morris deployed at the FCTC treaty meeting in Moscow that year (CoP6), as the company looked ahead to the 2016 session in New Delhi (CoP7). ITGA = the International Tobacco Growers’ Association.

This slide from the 2014 presentation shows some of the resources Philip Morris deployed at the FCTC treaty meeting in Moscow that year (CoP6), as the company looked ahead to the 2016 session in New Delhi (CoP7). ITGA = the International Tobacco Growers’ Association.

Philip Morris pushes for more delegates to FCTC treaty meetings from government agencies that deal with economic and trade issues. This slide from the 2014 presentation shows the company’s plan to lobby for more delegates from outside of public health on India’s delegation at the treaty meeting last year.

Philip Morris pushes for more delegates to FCTC treaty meetings from government agencies that deal with economic and trade issues. This slide from the 2014 presentation shows the company’s plan to lobby for more delegates from outside of public health on India’s delegation at the treaty meeting last year.

Excerpt from an October 18, 2014, email from Chris Koddermann, who led the Philip Morris team at the treaty meeting in Moscow that year.

Excerpt from an October 18, 2014, email from Chris Koddermann, who led the Philip Morris team at the treaty meeting in Moscow that year.

An October 18, 2014, email from Nguyen Thanh Ky, a Philip Morris corporate affairs executive, about his meeting with the Vietnamese delegation to the 2014 Moscow treaty conference.

An October 18, 2014, email from Nguyen Thanh Ky, a Philip Morris corporate affairs executive, about his meeting with the Vietnamese delegation to the 2014 Moscow treaty conference.

Excerpt from an October 2014 email from Gustavo Bosio, then Philip Morris manager for international trade, a few days after the end of the Moscow meeting.

Excerpt from an October 2014 email from Gustavo Bosio, then Philip Morris manager for international trade, a few days after the end of the Moscow meeting.

Excerpt from a Philip Morris briefing paper on trade arguments, ahead of the treaty meeting in India last year. The company has long argued that the biennial Conference of the Parties (COP) should leave trade issues to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Excerpt from a Philip Morris briefing paper on trade arguments, ahead of the treaty meeting in India last year. The company has long argued that the biennial Conference of the Parties (COP) should leave trade issues to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Excerpt from a Philip Morris briefing paper on potential risks ahead of the treaty meeting last year, “COP7” in India. ENDS, or Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems, refers to electronic cigarettes.

Excerpt from a Philip Morris briefing paper on potential risks ahead of the treaty meeting last year, “COP7” in India. ENDS, or Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems, refers to electronic cigarettes.

Excerpt from a 2011 draft Philip Morris plan for responding to moves in Israel to pass new anti-smoking measures.

Excerpt from a 2011 draft Philip Morris plan for responding to moves in Israel to pass new anti-smoking measures.

 In this slide from a Japan corporate affairs presentation, some ministers in the Japanese cabinet are identified according to their positions on tobacco. The two ministers designated “Pro-tobacco” did not respond to questions from Reuters.

In this slide from a Japan corporate affairs presentation, some ministers in the Japanese cabinet are identified according to their positions on tobacco. The two ministers designated “Pro-tobacco” did not respond to questions from Reuters.

This slide, also from the Japan presentation, talks about Philip Morris Japan maintaining good relations with members of Japan’s FCTC delegation, and a Philip Morris executive meeting with members of the country’s FCTC delegation. (MOF = Ministry of Finance; MOFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs; JT = Japan Tobacco.)

This slide, also from the Japan presentation, talks about Philip Morris Japan maintaining good relations with members of Japan’s FCTC delegation, and a Philip Morris executive meeting with members of the country’s FCTC delegation. (MOF = Ministry of Finance; MOFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs; JT = Japan Tobacco.)

This slide, also from the Japan presentation, reveals the company’s plans for opposing moves in Australia to bar the use of logos or distinctive coloring on cigarette packs. The measure is known as plain packaging, or PP. The Tobacco Institute of Japan, or TIOJ, declined to comment.

This slide, also from the Japan presentation, reveals the company’s plans for opposing moves in Australia to bar the use of logos or distinctive coloring on cigarette packs. The measure is known as plain packaging, or PP. The Tobacco Institute of Japan, or TIOJ, declined to comment.

A slide from a Philip Morris training document.

A slide from a Philip Morris training document.

“Our everyday business”

Philip Morris International’s full response to Reuters findings:

“As a company in a highly regulated industry, speaking with governments is part of our everyday business. We publicly supported the creation of the framework convention on tobacco control, were involved in the consultation process prior to its establishment, but have not since been invited to contribute to any discussions on tobacco control measures. With our product knowledge, technical expertise and our vision to replace cigarettes with less harmful alternatives, we believe we have something to contribute and we look for a range of legitimate opportunities to express our views to decision-makers. The fact that Reuters has seen internal emails discussing our engagement with governments does not make those interactions inappropriate. We believe that the active participation of public health experts, policy-makers, scientists, and the industry is the best way to effectively address tobacco regulations in the genuine interest of today’s billion smokers. It is our hope that moving forward, all tobacco policy makers will invite open dialogue, and in the meantime we will continue to speak with governments about policies that can address the impact of smoking on health.”

– Tony Snyder, Vice President of Communications, Philip Morris International

The documents, combined with reporting in 14 countries from Brazil to Uganda to Vietnam, reveal that a goal of Philip Morris is to increase the number of delegates at the treaty conventions who are not from health ministries or involved in public health. That’s happening: A Reuters analysis of delegates to the FCTC’s biennial conference shows a rise since the first convention in 2006 in the number of officials from ministries like trade, finance and agriculture for whom tobacco revenues can be a higher priority than health concerns.

Philip Morris International says there is nothing improper about its executives engaging with government officials. “As a company in a highly regulated industry, speaking with governments is part of our everyday business,” Tony Snyder, vice president of communications, said in a statement in response to Reuters’ findings. “The fact that Reuters has seen internal emails discussing our engagement with governments does not make those interactions inappropriate.”

In a series of interviews in Europe and Asia, Philip Morris executive Andrew Cave said company employees are under strict instructions to obey both the company’s own conduct policies and local law in the countries where they operate. Cave, a director of corporate affairs, said that while Philip Morris disagrees with some aspects of the FCTC treaty and consults with delegates offsite during its conferences, ultimately the delegations “make their own decisions.”

“We’re respectful of the fact that this is their week and their event,” said Cave in an interview in New Delhi, as the parties to the treaty met last November. Asked in an earlier interview whether Philip Morris conducts a formal campaign targeting the treaty’s biennial conferences, Cave gave a flat “no.”

When the FCTC delegates gather, lives hang in the balance. Decisions taken at the conferences over the past decade, including a ban on smoking in public places, are saving millions of lives, according to researchers at Georgetown University Medical Center.

Between 2007 and 2014, more than 53 million people in 88 countries stopped smoking because those nations imposed stringent anti-smoking measures recommended by the WHO, according to their December 2016 study. Because of the treaty, an estimated 22 million smoking-related deaths will be averted, the researchers found.

According to the WHO, though, tobacco use remains the leading preventable cause of death – and by 2030 will be responsible for eight million deaths a year, up from six million now.

There was jubilation among anti-smoking advocates when the treaty was adopted in 2003. The treaty, which took effect in 2005, made it possible to push for measures that once seemed radical, such as smoke-free bars. About 90 percent of all nations eventually joined. A big holdout is the United States, which signed the treaty but has yet to ratify it.

Since the FCTC came into force, it has persuaded dozens of nations to boost taxes on tobacco products, pass laws banning smoking in public places and increase the size of health warnings on cigarette packs. Treaty members gather every two years to consider new provisions or strengthen old ones at a meeting called the Conference of the Parties, or COP, which first convened in 2006 in Geneva.

But an FCTC report shows that implementation of important sections of the treaty is stalling. There has been no further progress in the implementation of 7 out of 16 “substantive” treaty articles since 2014, according to a report by the FCTC Secretariat in June last year.

A key reason: “The tobacco industry continues to be the most important barrier in implementation of the Convention.”

Indeed, the tobacco industry has weathered the tighter regulation. There has been only a slight 1.9 percent decline in global cigarette sales since the treaty took effect in 2005, and more people smoked daily in 2015 than a decade earlier, studies show. The Thomson Reuters Global Tobacco Index, which tracks tobacco stocks, has risen more than 100 percent in the past decade, largely due to price increases.

“Some people think that with tobacco, you’ve won the battle,” said former Finnish Health Minister Pekka Puska, who chaired an FCTC committee last year. “No way,” he said. “The tobacco industry is more powerful than ever.”

With 600 corporate affairs executives, according to a November 2015 internal email, Philip Morris has one of the world’s biggest corporate lobbying arms. That army, and $7 billion-plus in annual net profit, gives Philip Morris the resources to overwhelm the FCTC.

The treaty is overseen by 19 staff at a Secretariat office hosted by the WHO in Geneva. The Secretariat spends on average less than $6 million a year. Even when buttressed by anti-smoking groups, the Secretariat is outgunned. Its budget for this year and last year for supporting the treaty clause on combating tobacco company influence is less than $460,000.

Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva, head of the FCTC treaty Secretariat, is the person tasked with preventing the industry from neutering the agreement.

In two interviews at her Geneva office, da Costa e Silva, a medical doctor who holds a PhD in public health and has a dyed pink streak in her hair, explained why the FCTC banned attendance by any member of the public at the 2014 biennial conference in Moscow. The ban came in response to efforts by tobacco executives to use public badges to get inside the venue, she said, adding that industry representatives then started borrowing badges from delegates they knew to gain entry.

“It’s a real war,” said da Costa e Silva.

tobacco

“Some people think that with tobacco, you’ve won the battle. No way… The tobacco industry is more powerful than ever.”

Former Finnish Health Minister Pekka Puska, who chaired an FCTC committee last year

But she had only a partial picture of the forces ranged against her. She wasn’t aware of the fact that Philip Morris had a large team operating throughout the convention in Moscow, or the details of its activities in New Delhi last November.

“This is so disgusting. These are the forces against which we have to work,” da Costa e Silva said in May after being told about the Philip Morris documents. “I think they want to implode the treaty.”

The idea of a global tobacco treaty had been discussed among health advocates since at least 1979, when a WHO committee suggested the possibility. Gro Harlem Brundtland, a former prime minister of Norway who became director-general of the WHO in 1998, made it happen.

She was aided by outrage over documents that surfaced as part of the landmark 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, in which the four largest U.S. tobacco companies agreed to pay more than $200 billion to 46 U.S. states. The internal communications showed that tobacco executives lied for years about their knowledge of the deadly nature of cigarettes.

A 1989 document revealed one company’s plan to fight threats to the industry. “WHO’s impact and influence is indisputable,” the document said. It went on to contemplate “countermeasures designed to contain/neutralize/re-orient the WHO.”

That company was Philip Morris.

In 2008, Altria Group Inc split up its Philip Morris business. Philip Morris USA, which remains a subsidiary of Altria, sells Marlboro and other brands in the United States. Philip Morris International was spun off, and handles business abroad. Since the split, Philip Morris International shares have more than doubled and Altria’s have more than tripled.

Philip Morris International’s operational headquarters are in Lausanne, Switzerland, down the street from a patch of Gallo-Roman ruins, in a sleek building with a cafeteria, gym and a patio facing Lake Geneva. From there, the company is working to hobble the treaty.

Internal company communications reveal the scope of Philip Morris’ operation during the 2014 FCTC treaty meeting in Moscow. The company set up a “Coordinating Room” that could seat 42 people, according to the 2014 PowerPoint presentation, titled “Corporate affairs approach and issues.”

Leading the operation was executive Chris Koddermann. Formerly a lawyer and lobbyist in Canada, Koddermann joined Philip Morris in 2010. He is now a director of regulatory affairs in Lausanne. The PowerPoint describes the ideal corporate affairs executive as someone who is able to “play the political game.” Koddermann previously worked for federal and provincial cabinet ministers in Canada, according to his LinkedIn profile.

Reached on his cell phone in March, Koddermann said he wouldn’t be able to meet and that any questions should be directed to Philip Morris International.

At the end of the Moscow meeting, on Oct. 18, 2014, Koddermann sent an email congratulating a 33-person Philip Morris team on their success in diluting or blocking measures intended to strengthen tobacco controls and reduce cigarette sales. The gains he touted at the end of the week-long conference were the culmination of a two-year effort, his email said.

The documents shed light on one key objective in Philip Morris’ FCTC campaign: Keep tobacco within the ambit of international trade deals, so that the company has a way to mount legal campaigns against tobacco regulations.

In Moscow, one proposal initially called for carving out tobacco from trade pacts. International trade treaties often include provisions, such as the protection of trademarks, that Philip Morris has used to challenge anti-smoking measures. If tobacco were taken out of the treaties, as suggested by the proposal, Philip Morris could be deprived of many such legal arguments.

An early draft asked parties to support efforts to exclude tobacco from trade pacts and to prevent the industry from “abusing” trade and investment rules. In the end, the proposal was watered down. The final decision only reminded parties of “the possibility to take into account their public health objectives in their negotiation of trade and investment agreements.” There was no mention of excluding tobacco.

Koddermann, in his email to colleagues on the last day of the conference, declared victory, describing the change as “a tremendous outcome.” Overall, the company achieved its “trade related campaign objectives,” including “avoiding a declaration of health over trade” and “avoiding the recognition of the FCTC as an international standard,” he wrote.

The win was significant. A former Philip Morris employee said the company has routinely used trade treaties to challenge tobacco control laws. The aim, he said, was “to scare governments away from doing regulatory changes.” Even though the tobacco industry has lost a series of major legal battles, its suits have served to discourage the implementation of regulations that curb smoking. Those delays can yield years of unimpeded sales.

As the Philip Morris PowerPoint presentation from 2014 put it: “Roadblocks are as important as solutions.”

One roadblock was a campaign to stop the 2011 introduction of rules in Australia banning logos and distinctive coloring on cigarette packs. The company’s litigation and arbitration against the measure ultimately were dismissed – but not before five countries filed complaints against Australia on the same subject at the World Trade Organization. The global trade body has yet to announce a decision in the matter.

The attempt to undo Australia’s regulations has had a chilling effect elsewhere. It slowed the introduction of plain-packaging rules in New Zealand. Citing the risk that tobacco companies may “mount legal challenges,” the government announced in 2013 that it was postponing the move and waiting to “see what happens with Australia’s legal cases.” The legislation is now scheduled to go into effect next year.

In his Moscow conference email, Koddermann also expressed pleasure at the fate of a proposal on farmers. Initial language would have recommended that countries restrict support for tobacco growers. The proposal was “significantly watered down,” he wrote. “This is a very positive result.”

Gustavo Bosio, at the time a manager for international trade, chimed in a few days after the conference in an email: “These excellent results are a direct consequence of the remarkable efforts of all PMI regions and markets during the past two years and throughout the intense week in Moscow.”

Philip Morris isn’t alone in seeking to weaken the treaty. Ahead of the 2012 FCTC conference, in Seoul, four cigarette giants – Philip Morris, British American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco International and Imperial Brands Plc – formed an “informal industry Working Group” to oppose various proposals on tobacco taxation, according to an internal BAT document reviewed by Reuters.

The 45-page paper, whose existence hasn’t been previously reported, noted that the group would coordinate “to the extent that these issues do not raise any anti-competitive concerns.” The paper outlined a global campaign planned by BAT to counter the FCTC, which was “increasingly going beyond” its mandate. And it listed objectives, including a bid to block discussions around the introduction of a minimum 70 percent tax on tobacco.

BAT declined to answer questions about the industry working group. Both Imperial and Japan Tobacco International said they didn’t want to comment on a document from a competitor. Japan Tobacco International said its tax experts met with counterparts from other tobacco companies to discuss treaty guidelines on taxation ahead of the 2012 conference. Philip Morris did not comment on the document.

The Philip Morris emails and documents don’t explicitly detail how the company pulled off the victories in Moscow. But they provide insight into the importance it places on wooing delegates.

The FCTC traditionally makes decisions by consensus, and so influencing a single national delegation can have an outsized impact. The treaty has a key clause meant to keep the industry from unduly influencing delegations. Article 5.3, as it’s known, says nations should protect their public health policies from tobacco interests. Guidelines that accompany Article 5.3 recommend that countries interact with the industry only when “strictly necessary.”

But the article – a single sentence – contains a loophole Philip Morris has exploited. The sentence ends with the words “in accordance with national law,” opening the door to arguments by pro-tobacco forces that any lobbying that’s legal in a certain country is permissible when interacting with that country’s representatives. They also argue that a sentence in a related document, the guidelines for Article 5.3, allows for such interactions to take place as long as they are conducted transparently.

Philip Morris International: Facts & figures

• Has its roots in a small tobacconist shop in London in 1847.
• Now operates in more than 180 markets.
• Famous for its iconic Marlboro Man advertising.
• Has six of the world’s top 15 cigarette brands, including Marlboro, L&M and Chesterfield.
• Spun off from the Richmond, Va.-headquartered Altria Group in March 2008.
• Operational headquarters are in Switzerland.
• Produces over 800 billion cigarettes a year.
• Share price has more than doubled since the 2008 spin-off from Altria.

Sources: Philip Morris International website; Reuters reporting

Lobbying strategy

The Philip Morris International documents uncovered by Reuters include guidelines and country-specific lobbying plans aimed at hobbling the WHO’s global tobacco control treaty and national anti-smoking measures. Strategies include:
• Lobbying lawmakers, bureaucrats and other government officials
• Trying to move tobacco issues away from health departments
• Deploying third parties, including retail groups, to make its case and exert pressure on decision-makers
• Engaging the media on tobacco issues and generating public debate to influence decision-makers

The tabs below show the company’s strategy in action in three countries in recent years, according to internal company documents. The extent to which Philip Morris’ actions affected the outcome in each case is unclear.

In September 2011, Israel’s health ministry proposed new measures to regulate flavoring and advertising of tobacco products. In a draft company strategy document from October 2011, Philip Morris said the proposals included “a few excessive and disproportionate measures” such as restricting the use of fruit or chocolate flavorings in tobacco products, and broadly prohibiting advertising and marketing of tobacco. Elements of the campaign: 1: Leverage established relationships with different government ministries, mobilize retailers to advocate against “excessive” provisions, and lobby the health ministry. 2: Lobby the government through third parties such as an Israel-based supplier of licorice. 3: Use Philip Morris’ database of more than 60,000 adult smokers to reach consumers and create a public debate through the media “to influence MPs,” or members of parliament. OUTCOME: The bans on advertising and ingredients did not go through.

In September 2011, Israel’s health ministry proposed new measures to regulate flavoring and advertising of tobacco products. In a draft company strategy document from October 2011, Philip Morris said the proposals included “a few excessive and disproportionate measures” such as restricting the use of fruit or chocolate flavorings in tobacco products, and broadly prohibiting advertising and marketing of tobacco. Elements of the campaign:
1: Leverage established relationships with different government ministries, mobilize retailers to advocate against “excessive” provisions, and lobby the health ministry.
2: Lobby the government through third parties such as an Israel-based supplier of licorice.
3: Use Philip Morris’ database of more than 60,000 adult smokers to reach consumers and create a public debate through the media “to influence MPs,” or members of parliament.
OUTCOME: The bans on advertising and ingredients did not go through.

A 2010 Philip Morris document shows the company drawing up plans to lobby Sweden in an effort to influence the European Commission’s new tobacco regulations for member states, known as the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). Elements of the campaign: 1: Engage the justice ministry to “put pressure” on the health ministry so that the Swedish representative on the European Commission committee opposes plain packaging and “excessive” health warning labels, and supports lifting the ban on snus, a smokeless tobacco product. 2: Build a “broad coalition” of “third-party stakeholders,” such as the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and get them to pressure the government. (The chamber told Reuters that it does not lobby on behalf of individual companies.) 3: Establish a retailer network and contact bloggers and journalists to voice concerns about issues, including plain packaging and point-of-sale display bans. OUTCOME: Plain packaging and point-of-sale display ban were not included in the directive, which came into force in May 2014.

A 2010 Philip Morris document shows the company drawing up plans to lobby Sweden in an effort to influence the European Commission’s new tobacco regulations for member states, known as the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). Elements of the campaign:
1: Engage the justice ministry to “put pressure” on the health ministry so that the Swedish representative on the European Commission committee opposes plain packaging and “excessive” health warning labels, and supports lifting the ban on snus, a smokeless tobacco product.
2: Build a “broad coalition” of “third-party stakeholders,” such as the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and get them to pressure the government. (The chamber told Reuters that it does not lobby on behalf of individual companies.)
3: Establish a retailer network and contact bloggers and journalists to voice concerns about issues, including plain packaging and point-of-sale display bans.
OUTCOME: Plain packaging and point-of-sale display ban were not included in the directive, which came into force in May 2014.

In January 2013, Osaka Prefecture in Japan held a public consultation on a proposal to abolish existing smoking rooms, with a “roadmap towards total smoking prohibition in all public places,” according to a February 2014 Japan corporate affairs presentation. The Philip Morris document describes it as an “extreme proposal.” Elements of the campaign: 1: Ensure that “relevant stakeholders” oppose the move. Philip Morris field sales staff engaged retailers and others. 2: Engage local politicians and work with the industry in pushing back against the proposal. OUTCOME: The proposal was withdrawn.

In January 2013, Osaka Prefecture in Japan held a public consultation on a proposal to abolish existing smoking rooms, with a “roadmap towards total smoking prohibition in all public places,” according to a February 2014 Japan corporate affairs presentation. The Philip Morris document describes it as an “extreme proposal.” Elements of the campaign:
1: Ensure that “relevant stakeholders” oppose the move. Philip Morris field sales staff engaged retailers and others.
2: Engage local politicians and work with the industry in pushing back against the proposal.
OUTCOME: The proposal was withdrawn.

One of the company’s targets has been Vietnam.

The day the Moscow meeting ended, Koddermann received an email from his colleague Nguyen Thanh Ky, a leading corporate affairs executive for Vietnam. Ky said he had a “debrief lunch” with the Vietnamese delegation and had a good outcome to report: The delegation was in favor of “moderate and reasonable measures” to be implemented over a “practical timeline,” he wrote. He did not specify which measures they discussed.

The Vietnamese delegation spoke up often during the Moscow meeting. A review of notes compiled by tobacco-control groups accredited as observers showed Vietnam’s interjections frequently mirrored Philip Morris’ positions on tobacco-control regulations. Just like the tobacco giant, the Vietnamese said a higher tax on cigarettes would lead to more illicit sales. Like Philip Morris, they said the FCTC should stay out of trade disputes. And like Philip Morris, they opposed proposals to set uniform parameters for the legal liability of tobacco companies.

The FCTC guidelines on taxation did ultimately include a WHO recommendation for a minimum tax of 70 percent – something Philip Morris opposed. But the proposal to give the treaty more sway over trade disputes was weakened, and measures to strengthen the legal liability of cigarette companies were delayed.

Vietnam’s foreign ministry did not respond to questions from Reuters.

As soon as the conference ended, the documents show, Philip Morris turned to the next one: the 2016 meeting in India.

The 2014 PowerPoint presentation outlined the need to identify ways to gather intelligence during the Delhi conference. In a separate 2015 planning document, the company talks about the arrangement of farmer protests in the run-up to the meeting. Such protests did take place – including one in front of WHO offices in New Delhi. Reuters couldn’t determine whether Philip Morris was behind those demonstrations.

While other major tobacco companies also sent people to Delhi in November, Philip Morris was distinguished by its stealth. Executives from the company did not sign in with their tobacco industry colleagues at the FCTC convention center and stayed at a hotel about an hour’s drive away.

The anonymity and distance helped Philip Morris approach delegates covertly. On the second day of the conference, a white Toyota van pulled away from the front of the Hyatt Regency hotel – where Philip Morris had its operations room – and headed for the FCTC treaty venue. The van was carrying Ky, its corporate affairs executive from Vietnam.

OFFSITE MEETING: During the treaty conference on the outskirts of New Delhi last year, a Philip Morris representative met privately with a member of the Vietnamese delegation, Nguyen Vinh Quoc. In the first picture (left to right), Quoc can be seen emerging from a session at the treaty conference on Nov. 8. In the second picture, a van that left a Delhi hotel carrying a Philip Morris representative heads for the convention center. In the third picture, Quoc can be seen exiting the convention center moments before climbing into the van. REUTERS/Duff Wilson; Tom Lasseter

OFFSITE MEETING: During the treaty conference on the outskirts of New Delhi last year, a Philip Morris representative met privately with a member of the Vietnamese delegation, Nguyen Vinh Quoc. In the first picture (left to right), Quoc can be seen emerging from a session at the treaty conference on Nov. 8. In the second picture, a van that left a Delhi hotel carrying a Philip Morris representative heads for the convention center. In the third picture, Quoc can be seen exiting the convention center moments before climbing into the van. REUTERS/Duff Wilson; Tom Lasseter

Ky’s driver talked his way past police at the barricade outside the conference center, where FCTC-issued credentials were checked, explaining that he was driving “VIPs,” the driver later told Reuters.

A few minutes later, a man in a dark suit walked out of the conference center, passed the van and stopped at a street corner. The van did a U-turn, and a Reuters reporter saw the man in the suit quickly climb in. He was a senior member of Vietnam’s delegation to the FCTC conference: Nguyen Vinh Quoc, a Vietnamese government official.

The driver, Kishore Kumar, said in an interview that he dropped the two men off at a local hotel. Kumar said that on several other occasions that week, he took Ky to pick up people from the Hotel Formule1, a budget lodging where Vietnam’s delegation was staying during the conference.

Ky and Quoc did not respond to requests for comment.

Asked by Reuters about the interaction between Ky and the Vietnam representatives, Philip Morris executive Andrew Cave thumped on the table in a bar at the hotel where company representatives were staying. Reuters should focus, he said, on efforts by the industry to develop so-called reduced-risk products – those that deliver nicotine without the burning of tobacco and which the company says reduce harm.

When pressed about the meetings with Vietnam, Cave thumped the table again: “I’m angry that you’re focusing on that, rather than the real issues that matter to real people.”

In a subsequent email, Cave said: “Representatives from Philip Morris International met with delegates from Vietnam” during the Delhi conference “to discuss policy issues and this complied fully with PMI’s internal procedures and the laws and regulations of Vietnam.”

Delegates, Cave said in separate interviews, are reluctant to meet openly with Philip Morris because they are afraid of being “named and shamed” by anti-smoking groups.

Some delegates questioned the extent to which Philip Morris shaped the decisions made at the Moscow conference, saying attendees genuinely disagreed on certain issues. Nuntavarn Vichit-Vadakan, a Thai delegate, oversaw many discussions as the chair of an FCTC committee at the Moscow conference. She said delegates differed over the regulation of e-cigarettes, for instance, and any lobbying the company carried out would not have determined the outcome.

The Philip Morris documents leave questions unanswered. In some cases, the documents show the company hatching plans to change an anti-smoking regulation or to monitor activists, but don’t always make clear to what extent or how the plans were executed, if at all. The 2014 PowerPoint presentation called for “achieving scrutiny” of tobacco control advocates and said a “global project team” had been established for this purpose. It did not list what means would be used.

In some instances, Philip Morris’ lobbying plainly failed. In July 2015, the Ugandan parliament passed sweeping new anti-tobacco laws inspired by the treaty. All that was needed was President Yoweri Museveni’s signature, and the small African nation would become a leader on the continent in implementing a strict interpretation of the FCTC.

Philip Morris sent an executive, a younger white man, to tell the septuagenarian president, who long ago had helped topple dictator Idi Amin, why the tobacco act was a bad idea. Sheila Ndyanabangi, Uganda’s lead health official for tobacco issues who was present at the meeting, described the executive’s approach as lecturing the statesman.

“He said, ‘Ugandan tobacco will be too expensive’ and ‘it will not be competitive,’” Ndyanabangi said. Her account was confirmed by a senior Ugandan government official who was also present.

Museveni stared for a moment at the Philip Morris executive and a representative from a major tobacco buyer who’d come with him. The president then declared: “Slavery ended a long time ago.” There was a long silence in the room, recalled Ndyanabangi. Museveni said Uganda didn’t need tobacco, and the meeting was over. The president signed the bill that September.

Museveni’s office did not respond to requests for comment.

Over time, however, the industry’s lobbying has slowed the treaty’s progress. At the biennial conferences, the discussions have changed. In Moscow, for instance, there was a strong focus on trade and taxes. “You could see from the floor that interventions were very, very, very much focusing on the trade aspects, many times even putting trade over health,” the FCTC’s da Costa e Silva said in an interview last year.

The composition of FCTC delegations sent by governments has changed to include more members who aren’t involved in health policy. That’s in line with what Philip Morris and other tobacco companies want: Philip Morris, as well as British American Tobacco, has sought to move the balance of the membership away from public health officials and toward ministries like finance and trade. Such agencies, said the former Philip Morris executive, benefit from tobacco tax revenues and attach less weight to health concerns.

“The health department would just want tobacco to be banned, while for the finance ministry it’s more like how can we leverage or get as much money as we can,” he said.

The object of Philip Morris’ efforts, according to the 2014 PowerPoint on corporate affairs, is to “move tobacco issues away” from health ministries and demonstrate there are broader public interests at play – that “it’s not about tobacco.”

Cave, the Philip Morris corporate affairs executive, confirmed the company tries to persuade governments to change the composition of delegations. Health officials, he said, aren’t equipped to handle the intricacies of issues such as taxation.

“You’re looking at illicit trade, you’re looking at tax regimes, you’re looking at international law,” he said. “Now each of these areas, it’s logical, if you want to really tackle the trade and tobacco smuggling, illicit trade, who would you go to? You wouldn’t go to the health ministry.”

TOBACCO FARMERS: A worker tends to a tobacco crop in the farming community of Beatrice, Zimbabwe. At the treaty meeting in Moscow in 2014, a proposal calling for countries to limit support for tobacco growers was weakened. “This is a very positive result,” wrote Chris Koddermann, a Philip Morris executive, in an email. REUTERS/Philimon Bulawayo

TOBACCO FARMERS: A worker tends to a tobacco crop in the farming community of Beatrice, Zimbabwe. At the treaty meeting in Moscow in 2014, a proposal calling for countries to limit support for tobacco growers was weakened. “This is a very positive result,” wrote Chris Koddermann, a Philip Morris executive, in an email. REUTERS/Philimon Bulawayo

“I’m angry that you’re focusing on that, rather than the real issues that matter to real people.”

Philip Morris executive Andrew Cave, when asked about the company’s interaction with FCTC delegates

Reuters analyzed the rosters of the almost 3,500 accredited delegation members who have attended the seven FCTC conferences since 2006. The analysis found that there were more than six health delegates for every finance-related delegate in 2006. In Delhi last year, that ratio had fallen to just over three health delegates for every finance delegate. The number of delegates from finance, agriculture and trade fields has risen from a few dozen in 2006 to more than 100 in recent years.

Vietnam’s delegation, for example, has changed markedly. At the first FCTC conference in 2006, none of its four delegates were from finance or trade ministries. By 2014, in Moscow, there were 13 delegates, with at least four from finance-related ministries, including the chief delegate. Vietnam’s foreign ministry did not respond to questions about the delegation.

Da Costa e Silva isn’t opposed to having delegates from trade ministries, but she says their primary focus needs to be on health. And she was concerned by the makeup of the Vietnamese delegation. In a letter to the Vietnamese prime minister in late 2015, she asked that tobacco industry employees be excluded from the delegation. If they weren’t, she wrote, Vietnam might be “unable to play a full part in discussions.”

In 2016, Vietnam brought 11 delegates to the conference, of whom six were from health agencies, including the chief representative.

Some tobacco-control activists who attended the Delhi meeting in November say it was the worst so far in terms of passing new anti-smoking provisions.

Matthew Myers, who heads the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, said multiple countries came prepared to consciously block action. He said he heard delegates making arguments “I haven’t heard in 25 years.”

A Nigerian delegate, for instance, asked to remove a reference to “the tobacco epidemic” from a draft proposal on liability for tobacco-related harm, according to notes taken by anti-smoking groups.

Asked for comment, Christiana Ukoli, head of the delegation in Delhi, said the “Nigerian delegation strongly dissociates itself from [that] statement.”

The Delhi conference ended as it began, with treaty Secretariat officials not knowing where Philip Morris had been or what it had done. The company had flown in a team of executives, used a squad of identical vans to ferry officials in New Delhi, and then left town without a trace.

Watering down

Just days after the FCTC conference in Moscow ended in October 2014, Philip Morris executive Gustavo Bosio sent an email to colleagues highlighting what he said was the company’s success in pushing back on three treaty proposals related to trade issues. “These excellent results are a direct consequence of the remarkable efforts of all PMI regions and markets during the past two years and throughout the intense week in Moscow,” wrote Bosio, then manager for international trade. The first two columns in each tab below show the initial proposal and the final outcome, and are from an analysis Bosio attached to his email. The third column contains extracts from his email explaining what happened in each case.

fctc1

fctc2

fctc3

 

Source: Internal Philip Morris documents; emphasis added by Philip Morris. Note: “AMRO” refers to the Americas regional office of the World Health Organization.

Additional reporting by Joe Brock in Johannesburg, Ami Miyazaki in Tokyo, Mai Nguyen, My Pham and Minh B. Ho in Hanoi, Elias Biryabarema in Kampala, Enrico Dela Cruz in Manila, Stephen Eisenhammer and Anthony Boadle in Brasilia, Alexis Akwagyiram and Ulf Laessing in Lagos, and Patturaja Murugaboopathy in Bengaluru.

The Philip Morris Files
By Aditya Kalra, Paritosh Bansal, Duff Wilson and Tom Lasseter
Graphics: Jin Wu
Design: Troy Dunkley
Photo editing: Tom White and Altaf Bhat
Edited by Peter Hirschberg