Clear The Air News Tobacco Blog Rotating Header Image

FCTC

2018 Global Progress Report on Implementation of the WHO FCTC

FCTC Treaty – Hong Kong is still non compliant

Sadly Hong Kong is not amongst the 71 parties who have successfully implemented Article 5.3 and tobacco front legislators are not prevented from interfering in tobacco control legislation which they do with abandon.

One Liberal party legislator (Shiu) openly stated on Legco TV that he was ‘the representative of the tobacco industry in Legco’. Wong Ting-Kwong is an admitted advisor to the Tobacco Control Concern Group. Paul Tse is a supporter of HKUAIT /Stopit front group which is funded by PMI and the Coalition on Tobacco Affairs.

The Liberal Party and perhaps others are suspected to have been funded by the tobacco industry for many years (based on their actions and efforts on behalf of this industry in Legco) , but there is still no legislation to command the release of political party funding sources.

Long time Liberal member ($20) Tommy Cheung forecast doom and gloom for the catering industry and opposed initial Cap371 legislation here- of course this smokescreen has been proven to be, a smokescreen with massive increases in that industry’s receipts.

The funding of political parties under FCTC is frowned upon and where such funding exists the Government is required to ensure that such funding is revealed. When can we expect this to happen?

China (and thereby Hong Kong and Macau ) ratified the FCTC treaty in October 2005 – 13 years ago and numerous articles are not yet transposed into Hong Kong legislation.

The Treaty is a legal binding international instrument.

Neither has the Government yet adopted the FCTC requirement for all Government public officials /employees to declare and divest any and all tobacco stakeholdings; the MPFA allows its Trustees to invest in unethical shares whilst the MFPA own shareholdings have been divested of tobacco shareholdings. Regina Ip admitted on Legco TV to holding tobacco company shareholdings. Legco, Exco, members, District Councillors are confirmed by the ICAC to be public officials.

The FCTC directs parties to use tax preventive measures in excess of the inflation rate and other EFFECTIVE annual /regular tax increases on tobacco products to prevent youth initiation and to improve smoking cessation.

Increasing tax helps blue collar families – it does not punish them as certain legislators contend. Quitting leaves more money for the family food.

The local prevalence rate for males is higher than most western countries and overall prevalence is brought down by the ultra low female rate.

The last tax increase here was 2014, it was not effective and was too minimal hence tobacco remains affordable. As a result legal cigarette sales have INCREASED since then. (Source HK Customs)
Hong Kong is in breach of the FCTC requirements to implement all FCTC Articles into local law and prima facie in breach of Article 60 of the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Article 5.3 of the FCTC obligates Parties to “act to protect” their public health policies from the tobacco industry and other vested interests.

If Parties are working to advance the interests of the tobacco industry by allowing vested interests to deliberately hinder anti- tobacco legislation, they cannot be said to be protecting policies from the vested interests of the industry.

who-fctc-001

who-fctc-002

Download (PDF, 1.94MB)

Tobacco industry-funded Foundation fits in a longestablished and sinister pattern of corporate chicanery

Download (PDF, 149KB)

Removal of tobacco industry from interagency committee gets support

Download (PDF, 75KB)

35 countries announced a new commitment in tobacco control measures

Download (PDF, 147KB)

Hasten passing of tobacco laws tobacco control

MALAYSIA became party to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2003. FCTC Article 15 enumerates in detail measures to tackle illicit trade in tobacco products.

http://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/letters/2017/09/25/hasten-passing-of-tobacco-laws-tobacco-control/

Although the relevant authorities have been discussing the illicit trade in tobacco products, including preparation for the ratification of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (ITP) by Malaysia, there seems to be lack of or even absence of serious and effective measures to stop the reportedly growing illicit trade in tobacco products so far.

Article 15.7 of the FCTC calls for licensing to control or regulate the production and distribution of tobacco products in order to prevent illicit trade.

The National Kenaf and Tobacco Board Act 2009 amendment in 2010 stipulates licensing of tobacco and tobacco products.

Licensing of Tobacco and Tobacco Products Regulation 2011 has yet to be implemented amid continued opposition by the tobacco industry.

We must be reminded that the provision on the ban of kiddie packs under The Control of Tobacco Product Regulations 2004 was also delayed for over six years due to interference by the tobacco industry.

Again, this is in contravention to Article 5 General obligations of the WHO FCTC, which states in 5.3: “In setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”

With such blatant disregard to legal provisions and international treaty obligations, the tobacco industry’s typical threats of loss of employment, loss to tobacco farmers, increasing illicit cigarettes and now the increased use of illicit cigarettes by young smokers become the emotive justification by the industry and the front groups in chorus to blind and blinker all the public healthcare professionals’ expert recommendations.

Cigarette retailers and the cigarette companies are not a stakeholder in deciding public health policies. They have vested interest in the sale and promotion of tobacco products.

WHO reports link direct and indirect involvement of the tobacco industry in the smuggling and illicit trade of tobacco products. As such, they have no credibility and their proposal aims only to guarantee benefits to them.

Instead of entertaining regressive ideas and proposals, all related parties should be tightening the tobacco products supply chain under the Blue Ocean Strategy.

For a start, immediately institute a ban on sale of tobacco products at places other than permanent premises.

This measure was successfully used to tackle pirated CD/DVD sale by local governments before.

Hasten the implementation of licensing of tobacco and tobacco products by National Kenaf and Tobacco Board.

MUHAMMAD SHA’ANI ABDULLAH

Co-ordinator,
Tobacco Control @ Smoke Free Malaysia Initiative
Federation of Malaysia Consumers Association

UN Reports More People Warned Against Tobacco Use

Despite measures protecting a majority of people from tobacco-related illness and death, the tobacco industry continues to hamper Government efforts to fully implement life and cost-saving interventions, the United Nations health agency reported.

http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/features/health/1707/4690-1.htm

“One-third of countries have comprehensive systems to monitor tobacco use. While this is up from one-quarter of countries monitoring tobacco use at recommended levels in 2007, Governments still need to do more to prioritize or finance this area of work,” according to the UN World Health Organization’s WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic, which was launched today on side-lines of the UN High-level political forum on sustainable development in New York.

The report shows that some 4.7 billion people – more than 60 per cent of the population – are protected by at least one “best practice” tobacco control measure from the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC). These measures include no smoking areas and bans on advertising tobacco products, for example.

In the foreword to the report, the head of WHO urged Governments to incorporate all the provisions of the WHO FCTC into their national tobacco control programmes and policies, and to fight against the illicit tobacco trade.

“Working together, countries can prevent millions of people from dying each year from preventable tobacco-related illness, and save billions of dollars a year in avoidable health-care expenditures and productivity losses,” said Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General.

The report, funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies, noted that systematic monitoring of tobacco industry interference in government policymaking protects public health by shedding light on tobacco industry tactics.

Such tactics include “exaggerating the economic importance of the tobacco industry, discrediting proven science and using litigation to intimidate governments.”

Douglas Bettcher, director of WHO’s Department for the Prevention of Noncommunicable Diseases (NCDs), said tobacco industry interference in government policy making represents “a deadly barrier to advancing health and development in many countries.

Controlling tobacco use is a key part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Agenda includes targets to strengthen national implementation of the WHO FCTC and a one-third reduction in premature deaths from NCDs, including heart and lung diseases, cancer and diabetes, according to a press release launching the report.

“The progress that’s been made worldwide – and documented throughout this report – shows that it is possible for countries to turn the tide,” said Michael R. Bloomberg, WHO Global Ambassador for Noncommunicable Diseases and founder of Bloomberg Philanthropies.

Inside Philip Morris’ campaign to subvert the global anti-smoking treaty

The world’s largest publicly traded tobacco company is deploying its vast resources against international efforts to reduce smoking. Internal documents uncovered by Reuters reveal details of the secret operation.

http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/pmi-who-fctc/

A group of cigarette company executives stood in the lobby of a drab convention center near New Delhi last November. They were waiting for credentials to enter the World Health Organization’s global tobacco treaty conference, one designed to curb smoking and combat the influence of the cigarette industry.

Treaty officials didn’t want them there. But still, among those lined up hoping to get in were executives from Japan Tobacco International and British American Tobacco Plc.

There was a big name missing from the group: Philip Morris International Inc. A Philip Morris representative later told Reuters its employees didn’t turn up because the company knew it wasn’t welcome.

In fact, executives from the largest publicly traded tobacco firm had flown in from around the world to New Delhi for the anti-tobacco meeting. Unknown to treaty organizers, they were staying at a hotel an hour from the convention center, working from an operations room there. Philip Morris International would soon be holding secret meetings with delegates from the government of Vietnam and other treaty members.

The object of these clandestine activities: the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, or FCTC, a treaty aimed at reducing smoking globally. Reuters has found that Philip Morris International is running a secretive campaign to block or weaken treaty provisions that save millions of lives by curbing tobacco use.

In an internal document, the company says it supported the enactment of the treaty. But Philip Morris has come to view it as a “regulatory runaway train” driven by “anti-tobacco extremists” – a description contained in the document, a 2014 PowerPoint presentation.

Confidential company documents and interviews with current and former Philip Morris employees reveal an offensive that stretches from the Americas to Africa to Asia, from hardscrabble tobacco fields to the halls of political power, in what may be one of the broadest corporate lobbying efforts in existence.

Details of those plans are laid bare in a cache of Philip Morris documents reviewed by Reuters, one of the largest tobacco industry leaks ever. Reuters is publishing a selection of those papers in a searchable repository, The Philip Morris Files.

Dating from 2009 to 2016, the thousands of pages include emails between executives, PowerPoint presentations, planning papers, policy toolkits, national lobbying plans and market analyses. Taken as a whole, they present a company that has focused its vast global resources on bringing to heel the world’s tobacco control treaty.

Philip Morris works to subvert the treaty on multiple levels. It targets the FCTC conferences where delegates gather to decide on anti-smoking guidelines. It also lobbies at the country level, where the makeup of FCTC delegations is determined and treaty decisions are turned into legislation.

Excerpts from the Philip Morris Files

Reuters uncovered thousands of pages of internal Philip Morris International documents. These excerpts show the company’s tactics for combating the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, or FCTC, a treaty aimed at reducing smoking worldwide. (Some documents include highlighting by Reuters; some names have been redacted.)

01

A slide from a 2014 Philip Morris corporate affairs presentation about the FCTC, the global anti-smoking treaty. CoP5 and CoP6 refer to the biennial meetings of treaty nations in 2012 and 2014. “ENDS” refers to e-cigarettes.

Another slide from the 2014 PowerPoint presentation. “Paradigm shift” refers to an expected boom in what the company calls “reduced-risk products.”

Another slide from the 2014 PowerPoint presentation. “Paradigm shift” refers to an expected boom in what the company calls “reduced-risk products.”

A slide from the 2014 presentation shows Philip Morris plans for tracking anti-smoking groups, which the company calls anti-tobacco organizations, or ATOs.

A slide from the 2014 presentation shows Philip Morris plans for tracking anti-smoking groups, which the company calls anti-tobacco organizations, or ATOs.

The same 2014 document shows objectives for corporate affairs executives. “Roadblocks” refers to delays in implementing anti-smoking steps. “MoH” refers to ministries of health.

The same 2014 document shows objectives for corporate affairs executives. “Roadblocks” refers to delays in implementing anti-smoking steps. “MoH” refers to ministries of health.

Another slide from the 2014 document shows the characteristics that a Philip Morris corporate affairs (“CA”) person should possess.

Another slide from the 2014 document shows the characteristics that a Philip Morris corporate affairs (“CA”) person should possess.

A more detailed account of Philip Morris’ corporate affairs tactics from the same 2014 presentation.

A more detailed account of Philip Morris’ corporate affairs tactics from the same 2014 presentation.

A list of methods the company has devised for opposing the implementation of plain packaging, a measure advocated by the FCTC that bars the use of logos and distinctive coloring on cigarette packs.

A list of methods the company has devised for opposing the implementation of plain packaging, a measure advocated by the FCTC that bars the use of logos and distinctive coloring on cigarette packs.

This slide from the 2014 presentation shows some of the resources Philip Morris deployed at the FCTC treaty meeting in Moscow that year (CoP6), as the company looked ahead to the 2016 session in New Delhi (CoP7). ITGA = the International Tobacco Growers’ Association.

This slide from the 2014 presentation shows some of the resources Philip Morris deployed at the FCTC treaty meeting in Moscow that year (CoP6), as the company looked ahead to the 2016 session in New Delhi (CoP7). ITGA = the International Tobacco Growers’ Association.

Philip Morris pushes for more delegates to FCTC treaty meetings from government agencies that deal with economic and trade issues. This slide from the 2014 presentation shows the company’s plan to lobby for more delegates from outside of public health on India’s delegation at the treaty meeting last year.

Philip Morris pushes for more delegates to FCTC treaty meetings from government agencies that deal with economic and trade issues. This slide from the 2014 presentation shows the company’s plan to lobby for more delegates from outside of public health on India’s delegation at the treaty meeting last year.

Excerpt from an October 18, 2014, email from Chris Koddermann, who led the Philip Morris team at the treaty meeting in Moscow that year.

Excerpt from an October 18, 2014, email from Chris Koddermann, who led the Philip Morris team at the treaty meeting in Moscow that year.

An October 18, 2014, email from Nguyen Thanh Ky, a Philip Morris corporate affairs executive, about his meeting with the Vietnamese delegation to the 2014 Moscow treaty conference.

An October 18, 2014, email from Nguyen Thanh Ky, a Philip Morris corporate affairs executive, about his meeting with the Vietnamese delegation to the 2014 Moscow treaty conference.

Excerpt from an October 2014 email from Gustavo Bosio, then Philip Morris manager for international trade, a few days after the end of the Moscow meeting.

Excerpt from an October 2014 email from Gustavo Bosio, then Philip Morris manager for international trade, a few days after the end of the Moscow meeting.

Excerpt from a Philip Morris briefing paper on trade arguments, ahead of the treaty meeting in India last year. The company has long argued that the biennial Conference of the Parties (COP) should leave trade issues to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Excerpt from a Philip Morris briefing paper on trade arguments, ahead of the treaty meeting in India last year. The company has long argued that the biennial Conference of the Parties (COP) should leave trade issues to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Excerpt from a Philip Morris briefing paper on potential risks ahead of the treaty meeting last year, “COP7” in India. ENDS, or Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems, refers to electronic cigarettes.

Excerpt from a Philip Morris briefing paper on potential risks ahead of the treaty meeting last year, “COP7” in India. ENDS, or Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems, refers to electronic cigarettes.

Excerpt from a 2011 draft Philip Morris plan for responding to moves in Israel to pass new anti-smoking measures.

Excerpt from a 2011 draft Philip Morris plan for responding to moves in Israel to pass new anti-smoking measures.

 In this slide from a Japan corporate affairs presentation, some ministers in the Japanese cabinet are identified according to their positions on tobacco. The two ministers designated “Pro-tobacco” did not respond to questions from Reuters.

In this slide from a Japan corporate affairs presentation, some ministers in the Japanese cabinet are identified according to their positions on tobacco. The two ministers designated “Pro-tobacco” did not respond to questions from Reuters.

This slide, also from the Japan presentation, talks about Philip Morris Japan maintaining good relations with members of Japan’s FCTC delegation, and a Philip Morris executive meeting with members of the country’s FCTC delegation. (MOF = Ministry of Finance; MOFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs; JT = Japan Tobacco.)

This slide, also from the Japan presentation, talks about Philip Morris Japan maintaining good relations with members of Japan’s FCTC delegation, and a Philip Morris executive meeting with members of the country’s FCTC delegation. (MOF = Ministry of Finance; MOFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs; JT = Japan Tobacco.)

This slide, also from the Japan presentation, reveals the company’s plans for opposing moves in Australia to bar the use of logos or distinctive coloring on cigarette packs. The measure is known as plain packaging, or PP. The Tobacco Institute of Japan, or TIOJ, declined to comment.

This slide, also from the Japan presentation, reveals the company’s plans for opposing moves in Australia to bar the use of logos or distinctive coloring on cigarette packs. The measure is known as plain packaging, or PP. The Tobacco Institute of Japan, or TIOJ, declined to comment.

A slide from a Philip Morris training document.

A slide from a Philip Morris training document.

“Our everyday business”

Philip Morris International’s full response to Reuters findings:

“As a company in a highly regulated industry, speaking with governments is part of our everyday business. We publicly supported the creation of the framework convention on tobacco control, were involved in the consultation process prior to its establishment, but have not since been invited to contribute to any discussions on tobacco control measures. With our product knowledge, technical expertise and our vision to replace cigarettes with less harmful alternatives, we believe we have something to contribute and we look for a range of legitimate opportunities to express our views to decision-makers. The fact that Reuters has seen internal emails discussing our engagement with governments does not make those interactions inappropriate. We believe that the active participation of public health experts, policy-makers, scientists, and the industry is the best way to effectively address tobacco regulations in the genuine interest of today’s billion smokers. It is our hope that moving forward, all tobacco policy makers will invite open dialogue, and in the meantime we will continue to speak with governments about policies that can address the impact of smoking on health.”

– Tony Snyder, Vice President of Communications, Philip Morris International

The documents, combined with reporting in 14 countries from Brazil to Uganda to Vietnam, reveal that a goal of Philip Morris is to increase the number of delegates at the treaty conventions who are not from health ministries or involved in public health. That’s happening: A Reuters analysis of delegates to the FCTC’s biennial conference shows a rise since the first convention in 2006 in the number of officials from ministries like trade, finance and agriculture for whom tobacco revenues can be a higher priority than health concerns.

Philip Morris International says there is nothing improper about its executives engaging with government officials. “As a company in a highly regulated industry, speaking with governments is part of our everyday business,” Tony Snyder, vice president of communications, said in a statement in response to Reuters’ findings. “The fact that Reuters has seen internal emails discussing our engagement with governments does not make those interactions inappropriate.”

In a series of interviews in Europe and Asia, Philip Morris executive Andrew Cave said company employees are under strict instructions to obey both the company’s own conduct policies and local law in the countries where they operate. Cave, a director of corporate affairs, said that while Philip Morris disagrees with some aspects of the FCTC treaty and consults with delegates offsite during its conferences, ultimately the delegations “make their own decisions.”

“We’re respectful of the fact that this is their week and their event,” said Cave in an interview in New Delhi, as the parties to the treaty met last November. Asked in an earlier interview whether Philip Morris conducts a formal campaign targeting the treaty’s biennial conferences, Cave gave a flat “no.”

When the FCTC delegates gather, lives hang in the balance. Decisions taken at the conferences over the past decade, including a ban on smoking in public places, are saving millions of lives, according to researchers at Georgetown University Medical Center.

Between 2007 and 2014, more than 53 million people in 88 countries stopped smoking because those nations imposed stringent anti-smoking measures recommended by the WHO, according to their December 2016 study. Because of the treaty, an estimated 22 million smoking-related deaths will be averted, the researchers found.

According to the WHO, though, tobacco use remains the leading preventable cause of death – and by 2030 will be responsible for eight million deaths a year, up from six million now.

There was jubilation among anti-smoking advocates when the treaty was adopted in 2003. The treaty, which took effect in 2005, made it possible to push for measures that once seemed radical, such as smoke-free bars. About 90 percent of all nations eventually joined. A big holdout is the United States, which signed the treaty but has yet to ratify it.

Since the FCTC came into force, it has persuaded dozens of nations to boost taxes on tobacco products, pass laws banning smoking in public places and increase the size of health warnings on cigarette packs. Treaty members gather every two years to consider new provisions or strengthen old ones at a meeting called the Conference of the Parties, or COP, which first convened in 2006 in Geneva.

But an FCTC report shows that implementation of important sections of the treaty is stalling. There has been no further progress in the implementation of 7 out of 16 “substantive” treaty articles since 2014, according to a report by the FCTC Secretariat in June last year.

A key reason: “The tobacco industry continues to be the most important barrier in implementation of the Convention.”

Indeed, the tobacco industry has weathered the tighter regulation. There has been only a slight 1.9 percent decline in global cigarette sales since the treaty took effect in 2005, and more people smoked daily in 2015 than a decade earlier, studies show. The Thomson Reuters Global Tobacco Index, which tracks tobacco stocks, has risen more than 100 percent in the past decade, largely due to price increases.

“Some people think that with tobacco, you’ve won the battle,” said former Finnish Health Minister Pekka Puska, who chaired an FCTC committee last year. “No way,” he said. “The tobacco industry is more powerful than ever.”

With 600 corporate affairs executives, according to a November 2015 internal email, Philip Morris has one of the world’s biggest corporate lobbying arms. That army, and $7 billion-plus in annual net profit, gives Philip Morris the resources to overwhelm the FCTC.

The treaty is overseen by 19 staff at a Secretariat office hosted by the WHO in Geneva. The Secretariat spends on average less than $6 million a year. Even when buttressed by anti-smoking groups, the Secretariat is outgunned. Its budget for this year and last year for supporting the treaty clause on combating tobacco company influence is less than $460,000.

Vera Luiza da Costa e Silva, head of the FCTC treaty Secretariat, is the person tasked with preventing the industry from neutering the agreement.

In two interviews at her Geneva office, da Costa e Silva, a medical doctor who holds a PhD in public health and has a dyed pink streak in her hair, explained why the FCTC banned attendance by any member of the public at the 2014 biennial conference in Moscow. The ban came in response to efforts by tobacco executives to use public badges to get inside the venue, she said, adding that industry representatives then started borrowing badges from delegates they knew to gain entry.

“It’s a real war,” said da Costa e Silva.

tobacco

“Some people think that with tobacco, you’ve won the battle. No way… The tobacco industry is more powerful than ever.”

Former Finnish Health Minister Pekka Puska, who chaired an FCTC committee last year

But she had only a partial picture of the forces ranged against her. She wasn’t aware of the fact that Philip Morris had a large team operating throughout the convention in Moscow, or the details of its activities in New Delhi last November.

“This is so disgusting. These are the forces against which we have to work,” da Costa e Silva said in May after being told about the Philip Morris documents. “I think they want to implode the treaty.”

The idea of a global tobacco treaty had been discussed among health advocates since at least 1979, when a WHO committee suggested the possibility. Gro Harlem Brundtland, a former prime minister of Norway who became director-general of the WHO in 1998, made it happen.

She was aided by outrage over documents that surfaced as part of the landmark 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, in which the four largest U.S. tobacco companies agreed to pay more than $200 billion to 46 U.S. states. The internal communications showed that tobacco executives lied for years about their knowledge of the deadly nature of cigarettes.

A 1989 document revealed one company’s plan to fight threats to the industry. “WHO’s impact and influence is indisputable,” the document said. It went on to contemplate “countermeasures designed to contain/neutralize/re-orient the WHO.”

That company was Philip Morris.

In 2008, Altria Group Inc split up its Philip Morris business. Philip Morris USA, which remains a subsidiary of Altria, sells Marlboro and other brands in the United States. Philip Morris International was spun off, and handles business abroad. Since the split, Philip Morris International shares have more than doubled and Altria’s have more than tripled.

Philip Morris International’s operational headquarters are in Lausanne, Switzerland, down the street from a patch of Gallo-Roman ruins, in a sleek building with a cafeteria, gym and a patio facing Lake Geneva. From there, the company is working to hobble the treaty.

Internal company communications reveal the scope of Philip Morris’ operation during the 2014 FCTC treaty meeting in Moscow. The company set up a “Coordinating Room” that could seat 42 people, according to the 2014 PowerPoint presentation, titled “Corporate affairs approach and issues.”

Leading the operation was executive Chris Koddermann. Formerly a lawyer and lobbyist in Canada, Koddermann joined Philip Morris in 2010. He is now a director of regulatory affairs in Lausanne. The PowerPoint describes the ideal corporate affairs executive as someone who is able to “play the political game.” Koddermann previously worked for federal and provincial cabinet ministers in Canada, according to his LinkedIn profile.

Reached on his cell phone in March, Koddermann said he wouldn’t be able to meet and that any questions should be directed to Philip Morris International.

At the end of the Moscow meeting, on Oct. 18, 2014, Koddermann sent an email congratulating a 33-person Philip Morris team on their success in diluting or blocking measures intended to strengthen tobacco controls and reduce cigarette sales. The gains he touted at the end of the week-long conference were the culmination of a two-year effort, his email said.

The documents shed light on one key objective in Philip Morris’ FCTC campaign: Keep tobacco within the ambit of international trade deals, so that the company has a way to mount legal campaigns against tobacco regulations.

In Moscow, one proposal initially called for carving out tobacco from trade pacts. International trade treaties often include provisions, such as the protection of trademarks, that Philip Morris has used to challenge anti-smoking measures. If tobacco were taken out of the treaties, as suggested by the proposal, Philip Morris could be deprived of many such legal arguments.

An early draft asked parties to support efforts to exclude tobacco from trade pacts and to prevent the industry from “abusing” trade and investment rules. In the end, the proposal was watered down. The final decision only reminded parties of “the possibility to take into account their public health objectives in their negotiation of trade and investment agreements.” There was no mention of excluding tobacco.

Koddermann, in his email to colleagues on the last day of the conference, declared victory, describing the change as “a tremendous outcome.” Overall, the company achieved its “trade related campaign objectives,” including “avoiding a declaration of health over trade” and “avoiding the recognition of the FCTC as an international standard,” he wrote.

The win was significant. A former Philip Morris employee said the company has routinely used trade treaties to challenge tobacco control laws. The aim, he said, was “to scare governments away from doing regulatory changes.” Even though the tobacco industry has lost a series of major legal battles, its suits have served to discourage the implementation of regulations that curb smoking. Those delays can yield years of unimpeded sales.

As the Philip Morris PowerPoint presentation from 2014 put it: “Roadblocks are as important as solutions.”

One roadblock was a campaign to stop the 2011 introduction of rules in Australia banning logos and distinctive coloring on cigarette packs. The company’s litigation and arbitration against the measure ultimately were dismissed – but not before five countries filed complaints against Australia on the same subject at the World Trade Organization. The global trade body has yet to announce a decision in the matter.

The attempt to undo Australia’s regulations has had a chilling effect elsewhere. It slowed the introduction of plain-packaging rules in New Zealand. Citing the risk that tobacco companies may “mount legal challenges,” the government announced in 2013 that it was postponing the move and waiting to “see what happens with Australia’s legal cases.” The legislation is now scheduled to go into effect next year.

In his Moscow conference email, Koddermann also expressed pleasure at the fate of a proposal on farmers. Initial language would have recommended that countries restrict support for tobacco growers. The proposal was “significantly watered down,” he wrote. “This is a very positive result.”

Gustavo Bosio, at the time a manager for international trade, chimed in a few days after the conference in an email: “These excellent results are a direct consequence of the remarkable efforts of all PMI regions and markets during the past two years and throughout the intense week in Moscow.”

Philip Morris isn’t alone in seeking to weaken the treaty. Ahead of the 2012 FCTC conference, in Seoul, four cigarette giants – Philip Morris, British American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco International and Imperial Brands Plc – formed an “informal industry Working Group” to oppose various proposals on tobacco taxation, according to an internal BAT document reviewed by Reuters.

The 45-page paper, whose existence hasn’t been previously reported, noted that the group would coordinate “to the extent that these issues do not raise any anti-competitive concerns.” The paper outlined a global campaign planned by BAT to counter the FCTC, which was “increasingly going beyond” its mandate. And it listed objectives, including a bid to block discussions around the introduction of a minimum 70 percent tax on tobacco.

BAT declined to answer questions about the industry working group. Both Imperial and Japan Tobacco International said they didn’t want to comment on a document from a competitor. Japan Tobacco International said its tax experts met with counterparts from other tobacco companies to discuss treaty guidelines on taxation ahead of the 2012 conference. Philip Morris did not comment on the document.

The Philip Morris emails and documents don’t explicitly detail how the company pulled off the victories in Moscow. But they provide insight into the importance it places on wooing delegates.

The FCTC traditionally makes decisions by consensus, and so influencing a single national delegation can have an outsized impact. The treaty has a key clause meant to keep the industry from unduly influencing delegations. Article 5.3, as it’s known, says nations should protect their public health policies from tobacco interests. Guidelines that accompany Article 5.3 recommend that countries interact with the industry only when “strictly necessary.”

But the article – a single sentence – contains a loophole Philip Morris has exploited. The sentence ends with the words “in accordance with national law,” opening the door to arguments by pro-tobacco forces that any lobbying that’s legal in a certain country is permissible when interacting with that country’s representatives. They also argue that a sentence in a related document, the guidelines for Article 5.3, allows for such interactions to take place as long as they are conducted transparently.

Philip Morris International: Facts & figures

• Has its roots in a small tobacconist shop in London in 1847.
• Now operates in more than 180 markets.
• Famous for its iconic Marlboro Man advertising.
• Has six of the world’s top 15 cigarette brands, including Marlboro, L&M and Chesterfield.
• Spun off from the Richmond, Va.-headquartered Altria Group in March 2008.
• Operational headquarters are in Switzerland.
• Produces over 800 billion cigarettes a year.
• Share price has more than doubled since the 2008 spin-off from Altria.

Sources: Philip Morris International website; Reuters reporting

Lobbying strategy

The Philip Morris International documents uncovered by Reuters include guidelines and country-specific lobbying plans aimed at hobbling the WHO’s global tobacco control treaty and national anti-smoking measures. Strategies include:
• Lobbying lawmakers, bureaucrats and other government officials
• Trying to move tobacco issues away from health departments
• Deploying third parties, including retail groups, to make its case and exert pressure on decision-makers
• Engaging the media on tobacco issues and generating public debate to influence decision-makers

The tabs below show the company’s strategy in action in three countries in recent years, according to internal company documents. The extent to which Philip Morris’ actions affected the outcome in each case is unclear.

In September 2011, Israel’s health ministry proposed new measures to regulate flavoring and advertising of tobacco products. In a draft company strategy document from October 2011, Philip Morris said the proposals included “a few excessive and disproportionate measures” such as restricting the use of fruit or chocolate flavorings in tobacco products, and broadly prohibiting advertising and marketing of tobacco. Elements of the campaign: 1: Leverage established relationships with different government ministries, mobilize retailers to advocate against “excessive” provisions, and lobby the health ministry. 2: Lobby the government through third parties such as an Israel-based supplier of licorice. 3: Use Philip Morris’ database of more than 60,000 adult smokers to reach consumers and create a public debate through the media “to influence MPs,” or members of parliament. OUTCOME: The bans on advertising and ingredients did not go through.

In September 2011, Israel’s health ministry proposed new measures to regulate flavoring and advertising of tobacco products. In a draft company strategy document from October 2011, Philip Morris said the proposals included “a few excessive and disproportionate measures” such as restricting the use of fruit or chocolate flavorings in tobacco products, and broadly prohibiting advertising and marketing of tobacco. Elements of the campaign:
1: Leverage established relationships with different government ministries, mobilize retailers to advocate against “excessive” provisions, and lobby the health ministry.
2: Lobby the government through third parties such as an Israel-based supplier of licorice.
3: Use Philip Morris’ database of more than 60,000 adult smokers to reach consumers and create a public debate through the media “to influence MPs,” or members of parliament.
OUTCOME: The bans on advertising and ingredients did not go through.

A 2010 Philip Morris document shows the company drawing up plans to lobby Sweden in an effort to influence the European Commission’s new tobacco regulations for member states, known as the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). Elements of the campaign: 1: Engage the justice ministry to “put pressure” on the health ministry so that the Swedish representative on the European Commission committee opposes plain packaging and “excessive” health warning labels, and supports lifting the ban on snus, a smokeless tobacco product. 2: Build a “broad coalition” of “third-party stakeholders,” such as the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and get them to pressure the government. (The chamber told Reuters that it does not lobby on behalf of individual companies.) 3: Establish a retailer network and contact bloggers and journalists to voice concerns about issues, including plain packaging and point-of-sale display bans. OUTCOME: Plain packaging and point-of-sale display ban were not included in the directive, which came into force in May 2014.

A 2010 Philip Morris document shows the company drawing up plans to lobby Sweden in an effort to influence the European Commission’s new tobacco regulations for member states, known as the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). Elements of the campaign:
1: Engage the justice ministry to “put pressure” on the health ministry so that the Swedish representative on the European Commission committee opposes plain packaging and “excessive” health warning labels, and supports lifting the ban on snus, a smokeless tobacco product.
2: Build a “broad coalition” of “third-party stakeholders,” such as the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and get them to pressure the government. (The chamber told Reuters that it does not lobby on behalf of individual companies.)
3: Establish a retailer network and contact bloggers and journalists to voice concerns about issues, including plain packaging and point-of-sale display bans.
OUTCOME: Plain packaging and point-of-sale display ban were not included in the directive, which came into force in May 2014.

In January 2013, Osaka Prefecture in Japan held a public consultation on a proposal to abolish existing smoking rooms, with a “roadmap towards total smoking prohibition in all public places,” according to a February 2014 Japan corporate affairs presentation. The Philip Morris document describes it as an “extreme proposal.” Elements of the campaign: 1: Ensure that “relevant stakeholders” oppose the move. Philip Morris field sales staff engaged retailers and others. 2: Engage local politicians and work with the industry in pushing back against the proposal. OUTCOME: The proposal was withdrawn.

In January 2013, Osaka Prefecture in Japan held a public consultation on a proposal to abolish existing smoking rooms, with a “roadmap towards total smoking prohibition in all public places,” according to a February 2014 Japan corporate affairs presentation. The Philip Morris document describes it as an “extreme proposal.” Elements of the campaign:
1: Ensure that “relevant stakeholders” oppose the move. Philip Morris field sales staff engaged retailers and others.
2: Engage local politicians and work with the industry in pushing back against the proposal.
OUTCOME: The proposal was withdrawn.

One of the company’s targets has been Vietnam.

The day the Moscow meeting ended, Koddermann received an email from his colleague Nguyen Thanh Ky, a leading corporate affairs executive for Vietnam. Ky said he had a “debrief lunch” with the Vietnamese delegation and had a good outcome to report: The delegation was in favor of “moderate and reasonable measures” to be implemented over a “practical timeline,” he wrote. He did not specify which measures they discussed.

The Vietnamese delegation spoke up often during the Moscow meeting. A review of notes compiled by tobacco-control groups accredited as observers showed Vietnam’s interjections frequently mirrored Philip Morris’ positions on tobacco-control regulations. Just like the tobacco giant, the Vietnamese said a higher tax on cigarettes would lead to more illicit sales. Like Philip Morris, they said the FCTC should stay out of trade disputes. And like Philip Morris, they opposed proposals to set uniform parameters for the legal liability of tobacco companies.

The FCTC guidelines on taxation did ultimately include a WHO recommendation for a minimum tax of 70 percent – something Philip Morris opposed. But the proposal to give the treaty more sway over trade disputes was weakened, and measures to strengthen the legal liability of cigarette companies were delayed.

Vietnam’s foreign ministry did not respond to questions from Reuters.

As soon as the conference ended, the documents show, Philip Morris turned to the next one: the 2016 meeting in India.

The 2014 PowerPoint presentation outlined the need to identify ways to gather intelligence during the Delhi conference. In a separate 2015 planning document, the company talks about the arrangement of farmer protests in the run-up to the meeting. Such protests did take place – including one in front of WHO offices in New Delhi. Reuters couldn’t determine whether Philip Morris was behind those demonstrations.

While other major tobacco companies also sent people to Delhi in November, Philip Morris was distinguished by its stealth. Executives from the company did not sign in with their tobacco industry colleagues at the FCTC convention center and stayed at a hotel about an hour’s drive away.

The anonymity and distance helped Philip Morris approach delegates covertly. On the second day of the conference, a white Toyota van pulled away from the front of the Hyatt Regency hotel – where Philip Morris had its operations room – and headed for the FCTC treaty venue. The van was carrying Ky, its corporate affairs executive from Vietnam.

OFFSITE MEETING: During the treaty conference on the outskirts of New Delhi last year, a Philip Morris representative met privately with a member of the Vietnamese delegation, Nguyen Vinh Quoc. In the first picture (left to right), Quoc can be seen emerging from a session at the treaty conference on Nov. 8. In the second picture, a van that left a Delhi hotel carrying a Philip Morris representative heads for the convention center. In the third picture, Quoc can be seen exiting the convention center moments before climbing into the van. REUTERS/Duff Wilson; Tom Lasseter

OFFSITE MEETING: During the treaty conference on the outskirts of New Delhi last year, a Philip Morris representative met privately with a member of the Vietnamese delegation, Nguyen Vinh Quoc. In the first picture (left to right), Quoc can be seen emerging from a session at the treaty conference on Nov. 8. In the second picture, a van that left a Delhi hotel carrying a Philip Morris representative heads for the convention center. In the third picture, Quoc can be seen exiting the convention center moments before climbing into the van. REUTERS/Duff Wilson; Tom Lasseter

Ky’s driver talked his way past police at the barricade outside the conference center, where FCTC-issued credentials were checked, explaining that he was driving “VIPs,” the driver later told Reuters.

A few minutes later, a man in a dark suit walked out of the conference center, passed the van and stopped at a street corner. The van did a U-turn, and a Reuters reporter saw the man in the suit quickly climb in. He was a senior member of Vietnam’s delegation to the FCTC conference: Nguyen Vinh Quoc, a Vietnamese government official.

The driver, Kishore Kumar, said in an interview that he dropped the two men off at a local hotel. Kumar said that on several other occasions that week, he took Ky to pick up people from the Hotel Formule1, a budget lodging where Vietnam’s delegation was staying during the conference.

Ky and Quoc did not respond to requests for comment.

Asked by Reuters about the interaction between Ky and the Vietnam representatives, Philip Morris executive Andrew Cave thumped on the table in a bar at the hotel where company representatives were staying. Reuters should focus, he said, on efforts by the industry to develop so-called reduced-risk products – those that deliver nicotine without the burning of tobacco and which the company says reduce harm.

When pressed about the meetings with Vietnam, Cave thumped the table again: “I’m angry that you’re focusing on that, rather than the real issues that matter to real people.”

In a subsequent email, Cave said: “Representatives from Philip Morris International met with delegates from Vietnam” during the Delhi conference “to discuss policy issues and this complied fully with PMI’s internal procedures and the laws and regulations of Vietnam.”

Delegates, Cave said in separate interviews, are reluctant to meet openly with Philip Morris because they are afraid of being “named and shamed” by anti-smoking groups.

Some delegates questioned the extent to which Philip Morris shaped the decisions made at the Moscow conference, saying attendees genuinely disagreed on certain issues. Nuntavarn Vichit-Vadakan, a Thai delegate, oversaw many discussions as the chair of an FCTC committee at the Moscow conference. She said delegates differed over the regulation of e-cigarettes, for instance, and any lobbying the company carried out would not have determined the outcome.

The Philip Morris documents leave questions unanswered. In some cases, the documents show the company hatching plans to change an anti-smoking regulation or to monitor activists, but don’t always make clear to what extent or how the plans were executed, if at all. The 2014 PowerPoint presentation called for “achieving scrutiny” of tobacco control advocates and said a “global project team” had been established for this purpose. It did not list what means would be used.

In some instances, Philip Morris’ lobbying plainly failed. In July 2015, the Ugandan parliament passed sweeping new anti-tobacco laws inspired by the treaty. All that was needed was President Yoweri Museveni’s signature, and the small African nation would become a leader on the continent in implementing a strict interpretation of the FCTC.

Philip Morris sent an executive, a younger white man, to tell the septuagenarian president, who long ago had helped topple dictator Idi Amin, why the tobacco act was a bad idea. Sheila Ndyanabangi, Uganda’s lead health official for tobacco issues who was present at the meeting, described the executive’s approach as lecturing the statesman.

“He said, ‘Ugandan tobacco will be too expensive’ and ‘it will not be competitive,’” Ndyanabangi said. Her account was confirmed by a senior Ugandan government official who was also present.

Museveni stared for a moment at the Philip Morris executive and a representative from a major tobacco buyer who’d come with him. The president then declared: “Slavery ended a long time ago.” There was a long silence in the room, recalled Ndyanabangi. Museveni said Uganda didn’t need tobacco, and the meeting was over. The president signed the bill that September.

Museveni’s office did not respond to requests for comment.

Over time, however, the industry’s lobbying has slowed the treaty’s progress. At the biennial conferences, the discussions have changed. In Moscow, for instance, there was a strong focus on trade and taxes. “You could see from the floor that interventions were very, very, very much focusing on the trade aspects, many times even putting trade over health,” the FCTC’s da Costa e Silva said in an interview last year.

The composition of FCTC delegations sent by governments has changed to include more members who aren’t involved in health policy. That’s in line with what Philip Morris and other tobacco companies want: Philip Morris, as well as British American Tobacco, has sought to move the balance of the membership away from public health officials and toward ministries like finance and trade. Such agencies, said the former Philip Morris executive, benefit from tobacco tax revenues and attach less weight to health concerns.

“The health department would just want tobacco to be banned, while for the finance ministry it’s more like how can we leverage or get as much money as we can,” he said.

The object of Philip Morris’ efforts, according to the 2014 PowerPoint on corporate affairs, is to “move tobacco issues away” from health ministries and demonstrate there are broader public interests at play – that “it’s not about tobacco.”

Cave, the Philip Morris corporate affairs executive, confirmed the company tries to persuade governments to change the composition of delegations. Health officials, he said, aren’t equipped to handle the intricacies of issues such as taxation.

“You’re looking at illicit trade, you’re looking at tax regimes, you’re looking at international law,” he said. “Now each of these areas, it’s logical, if you want to really tackle the trade and tobacco smuggling, illicit trade, who would you go to? You wouldn’t go to the health ministry.”

TOBACCO FARMERS: A worker tends to a tobacco crop in the farming community of Beatrice, Zimbabwe. At the treaty meeting in Moscow in 2014, a proposal calling for countries to limit support for tobacco growers was weakened. “This is a very positive result,” wrote Chris Koddermann, a Philip Morris executive, in an email. REUTERS/Philimon Bulawayo

TOBACCO FARMERS: A worker tends to a tobacco crop in the farming community of Beatrice, Zimbabwe. At the treaty meeting in Moscow in 2014, a proposal calling for countries to limit support for tobacco growers was weakened. “This is a very positive result,” wrote Chris Koddermann, a Philip Morris executive, in an email. REUTERS/Philimon Bulawayo

“I’m angry that you’re focusing on that, rather than the real issues that matter to real people.”

Philip Morris executive Andrew Cave, when asked about the company’s interaction with FCTC delegates

Reuters analyzed the rosters of the almost 3,500 accredited delegation members who have attended the seven FCTC conferences since 2006. The analysis found that there were more than six health delegates for every finance-related delegate in 2006. In Delhi last year, that ratio had fallen to just over three health delegates for every finance delegate. The number of delegates from finance, agriculture and trade fields has risen from a few dozen in 2006 to more than 100 in recent years.

Vietnam’s delegation, for example, has changed markedly. At the first FCTC conference in 2006, none of its four delegates were from finance or trade ministries. By 2014, in Moscow, there were 13 delegates, with at least four from finance-related ministries, including the chief delegate. Vietnam’s foreign ministry did not respond to questions about the delegation.

Da Costa e Silva isn’t opposed to having delegates from trade ministries, but she says their primary focus needs to be on health. And she was concerned by the makeup of the Vietnamese delegation. In a letter to the Vietnamese prime minister in late 2015, she asked that tobacco industry employees be excluded from the delegation. If they weren’t, she wrote, Vietnam might be “unable to play a full part in discussions.”

In 2016, Vietnam brought 11 delegates to the conference, of whom six were from health agencies, including the chief representative.

Some tobacco-control activists who attended the Delhi meeting in November say it was the worst so far in terms of passing new anti-smoking provisions.

Matthew Myers, who heads the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, said multiple countries came prepared to consciously block action. He said he heard delegates making arguments “I haven’t heard in 25 years.”

A Nigerian delegate, for instance, asked to remove a reference to “the tobacco epidemic” from a draft proposal on liability for tobacco-related harm, according to notes taken by anti-smoking groups.

Asked for comment, Christiana Ukoli, head of the delegation in Delhi, said the “Nigerian delegation strongly dissociates itself from [that] statement.”

The Delhi conference ended as it began, with treaty Secretariat officials not knowing where Philip Morris had been or what it had done. The company had flown in a team of executives, used a squad of identical vans to ferry officials in New Delhi, and then left town without a trace.

Watering down

Just days after the FCTC conference in Moscow ended in October 2014, Philip Morris executive Gustavo Bosio sent an email to colleagues highlighting what he said was the company’s success in pushing back on three treaty proposals related to trade issues. “These excellent results are a direct consequence of the remarkable efforts of all PMI regions and markets during the past two years and throughout the intense week in Moscow,” wrote Bosio, then manager for international trade. The first two columns in each tab below show the initial proposal and the final outcome, and are from an analysis Bosio attached to his email. The third column contains extracts from his email explaining what happened in each case.

fctc1

fctc2

fctc3

 

Source: Internal Philip Morris documents; emphasis added by Philip Morris. Note: “AMRO” refers to the Americas regional office of the World Health Organization.

Additional reporting by Joe Brock in Johannesburg, Ami Miyazaki in Tokyo, Mai Nguyen, My Pham and Minh B. Ho in Hanoi, Elias Biryabarema in Kampala, Enrico Dela Cruz in Manila, Stephen Eisenhammer and Anthony Boadle in Brasilia, Alexis Akwagyiram and Ulf Laessing in Lagos, and Patturaja Murugaboopathy in Bengaluru.

The Philip Morris Files
By Aditya Kalra, Paritosh Bansal, Duff Wilson and Tom Lasseter
Graphics: Jin Wu
Design: Troy Dunkley
Photo editing: Tom White and Altaf Bhat
Edited by Peter Hirschberg

Sunday Interview: Dr Mackay, tobacco industry’s worst nightmare

ANTI-TOBACCO advocate Professor Dr Judith Longstaff Mackay has been identified as ‘one of the three most dangerous people in the world’ by the industry. She was instrumental in developing the World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. In her recent visit to Malaysia, she shares her experience campaigning against tobacco in Asia since 1984.

“I HAVE been described as a ‘psychotic human garbage, a gibbering Satan, an insane psychotic, power-lusting piece of meat, Hitler and a nanny’ and they (the tobacco industry allies) threatened to destroy me. But such threats and offensive words never once diverted me from my cause,” says Professor Dr Judith Longstaff Mackay.

Dr Mackay, 73, wears many hats. The World Health Organisation (WHO) senior policy adviser is also senior adviser to Vital Strategies, part of the Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco and director of the Asian Consultancy on Tobacco Control.

Her recent visit was part of her capacity as a visiting professor at the University Malaya Centre of Addiction Sciences.

A recipient of British Medical Journal Lifetime Achievement Award (2009) and a Special Award for Outstanding Contribution on Tobacco Control (2014), she has published 200 papers, and addressed over 460 conferences on tobacco control.

Dr Mackay has received many international awards in recognition of her contribution on tobacco control. She was selected as one of Time’s 60 Asian Heroes (2006) and of Time’s 100 World’s Most Influential People (2007).

Question: Born in Britain, you moved to Hong Kong in 1967 after earning a medical degree from the University of Edinburgh in 1966. What led to your resignation as a physician in 1984, and then becoming a leading campaigner and advocate for tobacco control for the last 30 years?

Answer: I had a complete career change from cure to prevention and there were three main reasons for making the shift.

First, when I was working in a hospital in Hong Kong, we had a maxim on our male medical wards that every person we admitted was a smoker with tobacco illnesses, like heart diseases, cancer and chronic chest problems, which were often too late and too advanced to be cured.

I realised we had to go a step “higher upstream” to prevent this rather than merely providing the ambulance services at the end-stage.

I came to feel that hospital medicine was important but it works like a band-aid in comparison with prevention.

You may be able to save hundreds of lives in a lifetime in hospital medicine, but millions of lives could be saved if you work in prevention. It is a completely different ball game, and yet the money, prestige and attention all go to curative medicine; and that is similar around the world.

Second, was the realisation that although women’s health those days was defined very gynaecologically, more women were being killed by tobacco than by every method of contraception combined. I was particularly concerned that the tobacco industry was enticing women with promises of beauty, fame, emancipation and freedom.

The third reason was that the tobacco industry felt Asia was theirs for the taking.

They said it themselves — when asked about their future in the 1980s, “What do we want? We want Asia”.

Q: Why did the tobacco industry had their eyes set on Asia?

A: They wanted the huge populations and the large number of men already smoking who could be persuaded to smoke their brands of cigarettes.

They galloped into Asia with the dream of converting the 60 per cent of men who smoked local cigarettes to switch to international brands, and the second dream of persuading Asian women to start smoking. If this happened, their markets would be enormous.

It would not matter if every smoker in Britain stopped smoking tomorrow if they could capture the massive Asian markets.

Also, Asia was becoming more affluent, so, it was easier for people to afford cigarettes.

Thirdly, when I wrote an article in the South China Morning Post on banning cigarette advertising, a tobacco giant came down on me and labelled me as “entirely unrepresentative and unaccountable”.

The tobacco industry claimed that they were the best source of information on tobacco and they even said it has not been proven that “illness was actually caused by smoking”.

I was so outraged that it was just one of those tipping points in life in 1984. Everything came together and I realised that I really had to work on prevention rather than cure.

Ever since, I have been working principally with governments on the policy level to try and get the tax and the laws in place in tobacco control.

Q: You are known as one of the three most dangerous people in the world by the tobacco industry. What do you have to say about this?

A: Well yes, I’m proud of that. The reason that I got that title was essentially location. I happen to be in Asia and the tobacco companies wanted Asia. They saw this region as their future, but I set about thwarting their goals.

I went early on to countries like China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam and Cambodia and more recently to North Korea upon learning that British American Tobacco had gone into the country to get laws in place.

Q: In campaigning against tobacco use, what are some of the challenges you have faced?

A: I have had many problems, and was subjected to verbal abuse and even had death threats from allies of the tobacco industry.

Twice, I was threatened by the tobacco industry publicly, saying they would take me to court.

Nothing came of it, so it was either an attempt to intimidate me or to cast doubt on my credibility in the minds of the public.

In a television interview in South Africa, I openly said “I’m not a suicidal type, and if I were to be found knocked down by a bus, you need to find out if the tobacco industry is behind it before you look anywhere else.” And the industry was apparently furious with me for saying that.

However, their tactic now is not so much to attack people individually, but to threaten governments.

They threaten them under Constitutional Law on the rights of their products to advertise, and on freedom of speech and they attack them under trade treaties.

This is intimidating to governments and it can cost anything up to US$50 million (RM214 million) to fight these threats.

Q: You were one of the key persons in formulating the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the first international treaty on public health. Malaysia is currently drafting the Control of Tobacco and Smoking Bill after lobbying for it since 2004 and they have sought your expertise. What do you have to say about this?

A: If you look at Malaysia and Hong Kong, many of the things that these two jurisdictions have done in the last 30 years are similar, yet Hong Kong has managed to half its male smoking rate.

Hong Kong is down to 10 per cent smokers now, whereas prevalence rates in Malaysia have not really decreased (at around 22.8 per cent). I understand it is not something that can be done overnight.

But the fact that the prevalence has not decreased is either because the excise tax imposed on cigarettes is not high enough, or that the laws that have been passed are not being enforced. In the case of the tobacco bill, the tobacco industry has been an unseen hand behind the scenes.

Q: The Health Ministry plans to increase prices of cigarettes from RM17 to RM21.50 in the near future to deter people from smoking. Several industry players were quick to say that increasing the tax would only lead to increased sales of illicit cigarettes. Is this true? What is the link between the increase in excise tax and contraband cigarettes?

A: There is zero truth in this. This sounds to me suspiciously just like what the tobacco industry would say. Economists, tax, finance and customs officials know, or they should know, that putting up a tobacco tax is not related to any increase in smuggling.

Our Customs chief in Hong Kong, for example, had said quite categorically there is no relationship between the amount of tax that is put in place and smuggling, and that is the position of the WHO too. But the tobacco industry keeps repeating it so often that some governments have come to believe it.

This is one of their tactics. A United States-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) has been going around the world, saying “don’t put up the tax, otherwise, there will be a rise in illicit cigarettes”. What many governments do not realise is that it is funded by the tobacco industry.

Q: WHO proposes that the tax imposed on cigarettes should be at least 75 per cent of the retail price. How efficient would this be in reducing smoking prevalence particularly among Malaysia’s young as compared with other measures, such as school education programmes?

A: Ten experts from around the world were present at a conference held in Hong Kong and, each speaker was asked “If you have one thing to do in tobacco control, what would that be?” and every single one said “tax”. This is because higher prices make cigarettes unaffordable to young people.

Taxation is the most effective approach to controlling the spread of tobacco. Creating smoke-free areas is the second measure, followed by things like advertising bans and smoking cessation.

Some people say health education in schools is crucial. Certainly, everybody likes health education, but it has not been proven effective in bringing down the prevalence of youth smoking.

And you can tell it is not effective because the tobacco industry does not oppose it. They oppose tax increases, plain packaging and smoke-free areas. And because the tobacco industry fights them, we know these are the measures that work.

Q: What needs to be done to improve our health education programmes at schools?

A: School health promotion programmes do not work because traditionally they say that if you smoke, you will get cancer when you are 60 years or heart attack when you are 70 years. If you are only a 11-year-old child, it is totally meaningless.

We need to do much more to revitalise and revamp health promotion and health education. Smoking and non-smoking youth have, in fact, the same level of health knowledge about the harms of smoking. The difference between the two groups is whether they think smoking is cool or a dirty expensive habit.

We have got to make it attractive to be a non-smoker in the teenage years.

Q: The Control of Tobacco and Smoking Bill currently being drafted would see the minimum age for buying cigarettes raised to 21 years old, ban on displaying tobacco products and making it illegal to smoke in vehicles with children inside, among others. How effective would this be in tackling smoking prevalence?

A: (People aged) 8 to 23 years is a vulnerable period. If you can stop children from smoking at this age, they are less likely to smoke. Whereas before that, they do not have the kind of mature judgment to analyse what it will mean to actually smoke.

The tobacco industry is very interested in youth and young adults because one has to only smoke 100 cigarettes and he or she will become lifelong smokers. It is so addictive.

Q: Besides health effects, what are the other impacts of cigarette smoking to the country and its people?

A: Two out of every three smokers die from cigarette smoking, so, you are losing skilled workers. One in every three fires in the world is caused by careless smoking.

There is also loss of productivity. Smokers go out for seven minutes to smoke. So, that’s seven minutes every time they smoke. Smokers are sicker and die on average a decade before non-smokers, so families lose their bread-winner.

There are medical and health costs. There is smoke damage to buildings and fabric.

And then there is a massive cost of cleaning up all the litter, billions of cigarette ends, packets, matches and lighters that are discarded every day in the world.

The tobacco industry claims that tobacco control would harm workers and farmers. This is not true. We have got so many projects now, including right in the heart of tobacco-growing in China showing that if farmers grow alternative crops they actually earn more.

The second fallacy is that if restaurants go smoke-free, they would lose revenue. Nowhere in the world has that happened. The revenue, including in Hong Kong and California, where they have introduced smoke-free policies, has gone up and not down.

Another fallacy is the government would lose money if it puts up the tax.

This does not happen. Some smokers will still pay more for cigarettes, so the revenue goes up. The number of smokers will come down particularly among the young and the poor.

There are so many economic fallacies that some non-governmental organisations propagate. Sometimes, governments almost innocently believe these economic arguments.

Q: If the situation is so dire, why can’t countries impose a blanket ban on cigarettes?

A: No country has put a blanket ban on cigarettes. Authorities have learnt from the prohibition of alcohol in the United States (1920-1933), for example, that it leads to much bigger implications particularly with crime and corruption cases.

So, the idea is to slowly push tobacco use back, so that the reduction is genuine and it is done throughout the community. This is what every government is really trying to do rather than actually ban it.

Q: Malaysia aims to be smoke-free (the End Game of Tobacco) by 2045. Are we moving in the right direction?

A: I strongly commend Malaysia for the foresight in establishing the 2045 goal and targets; few countries have yet to do this.

Recently the prevalence of male smokers has begun to decrease.

It is going to require a major commitment by the government and a huge effort by academia as well as non-governmental organisations in achieving this goal.

The Health Ministry has worked out a year-by-year plan of reducing prevalence up to 2045. It has developed a roadmap and has filled in what needs to be done each year to achieve the goal.

But it is not a quick process: if a country reduces its prevalence by one per cent a year, it is doing quite well.

So, it’s possible for Malaysia, but it will be challenging.

Implementing rules for smoking ban out in July Tuesday, May 30, 2017

THE implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Executive Order (EO) 26, which sets strict guidelines on designated smoking areas, will be released in July,

http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/2017/05/30/implementing-rules-smoking-ban-out-july-544704

Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial said Tuesday. “We are looking at coming out with the IRR inside the 60-day effectivity period provided by the EO, likely before SONA,” said Ubial. Ubial said they are already crafting the IRR along with Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., Philippine Ports Authority, Land Transportation Office, Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, Maritime Industry Authority, Department of Tourism, Office of the President, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Justice, Department of Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Civil Service Commission.

Noticeably absent from the list is a representative from the tobacco industry. “We don’t think that their representation would in fact add value to the EO,” said Ubial.

To note, the Inter-Agency Committee-Tobacco (IAC-Tobacco) created under the Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003, has a representative of the tobacco industry as among its members.

Earlier this month, President Rodrigo Duterte signed EO 26, which imposes a nationwide smoking ban in public places. The IRR is expected to complement the provisions of the EO 26. But even without the IRR, the health chief said local government units (LGUs) may already come out with their respective tobacco control ordinances. “We hope that if we come up with the IRR, the specifics there will be clearer in the implementation. But even without the IRR, it is already implementable,” said Ubial.

She said LGUs can easily refer to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) as basis for their ordinances. “The FCTC is an international treaty that we signed and ratified. That can be the reference point of local ordinances,” said Ubial.

The health chief noted how there are local ordinances that are even stricter than the EO 26’s provisions as they are anchored on the FCTC, such as the LGU recipients of the Red Orchid Awards. “Actually, there are LGUs with ordinances stricter than our EOs. That can continue,” said Ubial. (HDT/SunStar Philippines)

Indonesian tobacco watchdog urges govt to sign FCTC to protect people

Ahead of World No Tobacco Day on May 31, the National Commission on Tobacco Control (Komnas PT), a coalition of organizations that has been staunchly campaigning on tobacco issues in Indonesia, has asked the government to draft a comprehensive regulation on tobacco control to protect society.

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/30/indonesian-tobacco-watchdog-urges-govt-to-sign-fctc-to-protect-people.html

Komnas PT chairman Prijo Sidipratomo said on Tuesday that the most important thing was for the government to immediately sign the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) to protect society from the dangers of smoking.

“Second, the existed tobacco bill that is being discussed by the government and the House of Representatives must be dropped,” Prijo asserted in a press statement.

Prijo said the demand was in line with President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s statement in February during the 2017 National Health Meeting, saying that we should not let the money that was supposed to increase children’s nutrition to be instead used to buy cigarettes.

The Komnas PT asked every party to join hands to protect the young generation from the dangers of nicotine addiction that could degrade the nation’s productivity.

Without a comprehensive regulation, more than 250 million people are left unprotected when facing the dangers of the cigarette industry that always looks for profits while harming the environment, economy, society and human rights, he added.

The commission criticized the House for wanting to delete the existing article declaring a “total ban of cigarettes advertisement in broadcasting” in a revision of the Broadcasting Law. (hol/dan)